

104
MARKUP OF H. CON. RES. 160
AND DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS:
MYTH OR REALITY IN AFRICA?

Y 4. IN 8/16:D 39/5

Markup of H. Con. Res. 160 and Demo...

HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION

APRIL 17, 1996

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations



U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

26-939 CC

WASHINGTON : 1996

For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402

ISBN 0-16-053642-1

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MARKUP OF H. CON. RES. 160 AND DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS: MYTH OR REALITY IN AFRICA?

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 17, 1996

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA,
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:12 a.m. in room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen [chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Before we start, I would like to point out two wonderful gentlemen who are here with us this morning. We have a terrific visit from the previous chairman of our International Relations and Foreign Affairs Committee, Dante Fascell of Miami.

Dante, we miss you; we wish that you were still very much a part of our committee and of our body, and I would love it if you would just say a few words. Tell us what you have been doing.

Mr. FASCELL. You are mighty kind. I am delighted to see all of you. I miss all of you, but I don't miss this place.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Dante is making lots of money down there as an attorney. I wish I could say he finally has an honorable profession—like my husband. But it is a pleasure to see you. I hope you can stick around with us for a while. You don't come up very often, so this is a real pleasure.

Mr. FASCELL. I have to work up my courage from time to time.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. It is always a pleasure.

Mr. FASCELL. I am glad to see all of you working on a very important matter for the country, our relations with Africa. I am delighted to be here and participate for a little while.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. We have a wonderful subcommittee and I think you have known most of us, and we have a good bipartisan working coalition.

Mr. FASCELL. Yes.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Especially on a topic like today's democracy in Africa, this is certainly not a partisan issue, and I think this is one of the best subcommittees of our committee because we do work in a bipartisan manner, and that is the legacy that you left for us as chairman for so many years of that entire committee. So thank you, Dante, for your many years of principled leadership and your warm friendship. We all love you and miss you.

The second pleasurable duty I have this morning is to welcome our newest member of our subcommittee, Mr. Tom Campbell. Tom

and I had served together along with many of you a few years ago. He went back to teaching and has now rejoined us in our committee, and it is a pleasure to have Tom with us again. Thank you, Tom.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Thank you, Madam Chair. I am thrilled to be back in Congress and very much thrilled to be a member of your subcommittee.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I think you will enjoy being a member of this subcommittee, and I know we look forward to your expertise on all these legal issues. He is a real stickler, so Amo watch out. We are going to move your resolution, Tom. I don't know if you will survive the Campbell scrutiny.

Mr. CAMPBELL. I will have several points to raise.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. We are meeting for two purposes: First, we are going to consider in open session H. Con. Res. 160, a resolution congratulating the people of the Republic of Sierra Leone on the success of their recent democratic multiparty elections.

Immediately following the markup, we will proceed to the schedule on democratic elections: myth or reality in Africa. First to our markup. House Concurrent Resolution 160 was introduced by our dear colleague, Amo Houghton, on April 15th and had been referred by Chairman Gilman by this subcommittee for consideration and we wanted to make sure we have as fast a hearing as possible. Two days was not too long, was it Amo?

Mr. HOUGHTON. No.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I would like to commend Mr. Houghton for his leadership, and also extend my best wishes to the people of Sierra Leone and all the other emerging democracies in the continent of Africa as they embark on a long and difficult journey toward the consolidation toward a free and open society and a stable system of government.

I would like to recognize the gentleman from New York, Mr. Houghton, to speak briefly about his resolution.

Mr. HOUGHTON. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. I would like to ask to advise and extend my remarks.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Absolutely.

Mr. HOUGHTON. Thank you so much, and all the members of this subcommittee, for letting me bring this before you today. I would like to thank Mr. Chabot, Mr. Payne, Mr. Hastings, Mr. Frazer, Mr. Campbell—Mr. Campbell, he is on the bill?—and Mr. Watt for cosponsoring this resolution and also for Senators Jeffords and Kassebaum in the Senate.

As you may know, the tiny West African nation of Sierra Leone has endured a terrible civil war under a military regime for the past 5 years that has displaced almost half the country's population. On February 26 of this year, Sierra Leone exercised their right to vote in truly democratic elections for the first time in nearly 30 years.

The subsequent runoff election was held on March 15th, and so on the 29th of March the Nation celebrated the peaceful transition of military rule to civilian leadership.

The delegation in the African-American Institute issued a statement after observing the election, and I would like to make it part of the record at this time.

[The statement appears in the appendix.]

Mr. HOUGHTON. The statement addresses that although there were some logistic difficulties, mainly due to a lack of infrastructure, the vote still went forward due to the fierce determination of a vast majority of the population. The elections were found to be free and fair by the entire group of international observers, including the British Commonwealth, and the United Nations. This would certainly not have been predicted only a short time before.

I don't think anyone believes that simply holding an election assures that a country is automatically on its way to a completely open, free, and a prosperous democracy. Nothing could be further from the truth. Free elections are certainly one of the first steps on the road to lasting democracy. That road is very long and it is a journey with no final destination.

A new democracy needs encouragement. That is the main purpose of this resolution. It doesn't suggest a major change in U.S. policy and won't make much of a difference to the U.S. citizen, but it is very important to the people of Sierra Leone.

Another matter stressed in the resolution is that if Sierra Leone does develop and is successful, the ripple effects on their notorious authoritarian neighbors, Nigeria, Liberia, and Niger, to name a few, could be significant. A South African writer suggested in a recent article in *The Washington Post*, "Rather than being seen as a rotten core, Sierra Leone could be a pinpoint of light in an otherwise gloomy landscape."

As we sit here today, negotiations between the government and the leaders put a decisive end to this civil war which ravaged the country for the past 5 years. Our resolution encourages all the people of Sierra Leone to work together as they negotiate an end to these conflicts.

And, finally, Madam Chairman, this resolution reaffirms the commitment in the United States to help nations move toward freedom and democracy, especially on the African continent. I think we all agree this is the goal in the United States that is worthy of our support.

I would like to especially thank President Kabbah and the people of Sierra Leone for their cooperation as our military evacuated Americans from the neighboring country of Liberia. Their help was critical and is very much appreciated.

Also, deserving special recognition, there are many citizens who have served our country in Sierra Leone, one of them being John Hirsch. I don't think John Hirsch is here today, but maybe we can extend our congratulations to him. He has been a wonderful help in that area.

Madam Chair, it seems we hear so much about the tragedies and misfortunes that happened in Africa, and it is nice to be able to be here today to emphasize the good things when they occur. I hope all members of this subcommittee, including Mr. Campbell, will join me in voting for this resolution.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I have given you a bad reputation. Thank you so much, Amo. I would like to recognize any member of the subcommittee if they would like to make any statements regarding Mr. Houghton's resolution.

If not—Mr. Payne.

Mr. PAYNE. Let me just say, first of all, Ms. Chairlady, I appreciate you calling the meeting, and certainly let me acknowledge the former chairman of our committee, Representative Dante Fascell, who for so many years has done such an outstanding job as Chair. It wasn't the Foreign Affairs Committee, that is for sure. It is good to see you.

Let me say I support H.R. 160 sponsored by Amo Houghton from New York. He continues to amaze me with his knowledge and his commitment to Africa and his previous life having been involved in the continent. The dedication and sincerity is appreciated.

I would also like to congratulate Sierra Leone on their democratic elections held on the 26th and 27th of February of this year. Groups of international and domestic elections polls reported that the elections of this year were transparent, open, and fair. Despite deadly conflicts between citizens and those seeking to disrupt the election, the election process was largely peaceful with no frauds or irregularities.

One citizen that watched the election in the southeastern town of Kenema said that on election day the citizens of that battlefront town who for 5 years have lived on the edge of a no-go area, that stretched to the Liberian border of 30 miles, ran into the streets with fire fighting that had been raging in the town and much violence that had gone on for several hours. The rebels had launched massive predawn attacks to scare voters away from the polls, but the people in that town said, we are determined. They shouted, "We want to vote," and vote they did.

Let me just once again join in the celebration of democracy for the people of Sierra Leone and congratulate Mr. Houghton for this resolution.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Payne.

Pursuant to notice, the subcommittee will now turn to the consideration of H. Con. 160 which the staff director will report.

Mr. TAMARGO. H. Con. 160 concurrent resolution congratulating the people of the Republic of Sierra Leone on the success of their recent multiparty democratic elections.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Without objection, the staff director will read the preamble of the text of the concurrent resolution in this order for amendment.

Mr. TAMARGO. H. Con. 160 concurrent resolution, congratulating the people of the Republic of Sierra Leone on the success of their recent democratic multiparty elections.

Whereas since 1991 the people of the Republic of Sierra Leone have endured a horrific civil war that has killed thousands of individuals and has displaced more than half the population of the country.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Without objection, the preamble in the resolution is considered as having been read and is open to an amendment at this point.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Are there any amendments?

If there are no amendments, the Chair will put the question en bloc of the resolution to the Full Committee.

So many are in favor of the question say yes.

The ayes appear to have it. The resolution is approved for forwarding to the Full Committee. That is it. We will contact Mr. Gil-

man about the proper consideration of your resolution, Amo. Thank you so much.

Mr. HOUGHTON. Thank you.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. We will now begin with the official subcommittee business about the hearing.

During this Congress, this subcommittee has held numerous hearings on the issue of democratization, focusing on the independent and dependent variables affecting this process in the African continent. One of the indicators frequently used to measure a country's level of democratization or its progress in its transition to democracy, is democratic elections.

But what are democratic elections? Can they be simply defined as free and fair or must other factors be considered before making such an assessment? Is the concept of free and fair elections synonymous with a democratic system of government? Does it translate into a free and just society?

Is one successful election indicative of a fully operational and effective electoral infrastructure? Some would say yes. Others, however, would disagree arguing that fair elections are merely a transitional element in the process toward democratization; that they cannot be evaluated on their own for they are a piece of the greater puzzle.

In the end, the questions posed would be whether or not democratic elections and democratic systems of government are necessarily interdependent, or can they be mutually exclusive and exist without the other. Does the focus need to be shifted to other indicators?

These are just some of the issues we will be addressing here today.

With the fall of the Berlin Wall over 6 years ago, it seemed that the wave of democratization would also sweep through the African continent. The end of the cold war seemed to propel and motivate others across the globe into popular activism and demonstrations, which eventually pressured some dictators and totalitarian governments in Africa to hold elections.

Recently, however, we have seen these fragile democracies begin to waiver with some succumbing to their tumultuous pasts. In fact, media reports and assessments from various international organizations, contend that most of the 18 African elections scheduled for this year will be riddled with fraud, shunned by opposition politicians or dwarfed by ongoing civil conflict.

Niger and Gambia have been shaken by military coups. The leaders who have dominated Togo, Gabon, and Cameroon remain in tight control after holding elections classified by many as fraudulent. In Cote d'Ivoire, the President has muzzled the opposition, with dozens reportedly killed during the election late last year. Equatorial Guinea's authoritarian ruler continues to suppress the opposition using violence, false imprisonment, and political maneuvers to isolate them from the electoral process.

And the list goes on. But the outlook for democracy in Africa is not bleak as it may seem, for there are many countries who are enjoying relative success.

Sierra Leone has recently held its first truly democratic multiparty elections. Cape Verde has been relatively stable since

its first multiparty election in 1993 which toppled the ruling party. Senegal is another example of relative stability resulting from its multiparty Presidential election in 1993. In addition, Benin held its second free election on March 18th. While some dislike the outcome, the victory of former President Mathieu Kerekou, whose 19-year tenure as Benin's leader left the country in economic and social upheaval, is a testament that Benin is a working democracy and that the people have embraced multiparty politics and are exerting their political will.

Then, there is Mauritius, Botswana, Sao Tome, and Principe, which have also been relatively successful in democratically electing or appointing legislatures and Presidents.

To reiterate, however, and to focus on the essence of this hearing, although many African Governments have conducted or conduct elections in one form or another, a limited number are considered to be "free" and "democratic" by Freedom House and other organizations focused on strengthening democratic institutions.

While a complicated issue, it must be addressed so as to adapt or change our approach to ensure that democratic elections are a reality in Africa; that they will truly lead to democratic systems of government; and to ensure that the ideals of democracy take a firm, unbreakable hold on the countries of the African continent.

Here to shed some light on these issues are five distinguished panelists from government, academia, and the private sector. We thank them all in advance for their insightful and informative testimony.

First, we will hear from an old friend of the Subcommittee on Africa, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs George Moose. Secretary Moose has spent his career in the State Department as a specialist in African affairs, with well over 20 years' experience in the region. He has served as ambassador to both Benin and Senegal, as well as in Washington and at the United Nations in positions responsible for African issues. He has received various accolades for his service to the Nation. He always received accolades from this subcommittee. Thank you, Secretary Moose.

STATEMENT OF GEORGE MOOSE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. MOOSE. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and members of the subcommittee. I am grateful to you for your initiative in organizing this hearing and for the opportunity it presents us to discuss elections and democracy in Africa.

Let me say first and foremost I can think of no more appropriate way to begin this hearing than with the resolution just passed on Sierra Leone. I commend the people of Sierra Leone for their effort and courage in carrying out an election which opens a real possibility for future stability in Sierra Leone.

Congressman Payne has documented the challenges, indeed intimidation, that people had to overcome in order to participate in that election, and I think it is a further reminder that the initiative, the force, the impetus for democratic change in Africa comes from the people in Africa.

That said, I think the United States can be proud of its role in the elections in Sierra Leone. It was the U.S. funding that sup-

ported the observer delegation of the African-American institute. Certainly when one looks at what happened in Sierra Leone, one has to commend and applaud the efforts of the people themselves, but I think it is incumbent upon us to look for ways to support and encourage and promote their initiative.

Madam Chair, I think the committee members have copies of my prepared testimony which I would like to enter into the record. Let me highlight a few points which I hope we can discuss at a greater length in the course of the hearing.

The evolution toward democracy in Africa has been a lengthy one, but no more so than in other parts of the world. The people of Africa began in earnest to abandon old forms of political ideologies in centralized economies even before the end of the cold war.

Turning to market reform and to democracy, the experience of the first 30 years of African independence led many in Africa to challenge governmental corruption and mismanagement that had left them, frankly, worse off than their parents had been 30 years before, and they became convinced that the solutions to their problems really did lie in more transparent systems of government. And they believed that democracy would, in fact, allow them a greater voice in the political economic decision that is affecting their lives. In other words, Africans have been seeking democracy for the very same reasons we promote it; because it provides the best hope for prosperity, for peace, and for a better tomorrow.

What have those experiments in African democracy produced? Well, the picture is, quite frankly, a mixed one. Each country is unique in its history, culture, and challenges that it confronts. There have been some very strong democratic successes. We touched on some of those this morning. There have also been countries that began well; then stumbled. There have been countries that have taken steps backward.

In their efforts to introduce democracy, elections have been central and key to that progress. There is a common misperception that elections in Africa, most of those elections have been flawed, and that is far from the case. The reality is of the 30 elections that have been carried out over the last 6 or 7 years, 22, or two-thirds of them, have been recognized and judged fair and free by both indigenous and international juries, and already four countries have conducted second-round elections that have also been judged fair and free.

When we looked across the sub-Saharan continent, we find 23 countries that can be counted as functioning democracies up from only 5 in 1989. I think it is important to note that even in countries where we have witnessed flawed electoral processes, we see political change and political openings that have created continued possibilities for change. Ethnic diversity, certainly decades of authoritarian rule and economic troubles do complicate the already difficult challenge of democratic transformation.

African leaders must find their own institutions. I say Africans must find their own leaders and their own institutions that fit their culture and circumstances. And this does require time and experimentation.

But as we assess democracy in Africa, I think we must look beyond the success or failure of any particular election. I think we need to ask are people making greater progress in determining who governs them, not only at the national level but also the local level? Do they have a better opportunity to hear and understand all views? Can they criticize their political leadership without fear of reprisal? Do their laws and their institutions offer greater support and protection for basic human rights? I think when we ask these questions we find that democracy is, indeed, quietly taking hold in Africa.

For example, following closely on the generally free and fair elections in Benin, President Soglo stepped aside, just as President Kerekou had 5 years earlier. In the Central African Republic, minority representatives in the new multiparty legislature forced the resignation of the Prime Minister for mismanagement. In Kenya, the legislature recently turned back a bill designed to restrict freedom of the press. Eleven countries now have independent electoral commissions to manage, and Mali will soon be the 12th.

I think the most dramatic change we have seen is the change in African civil society. Beginning in the early 1990's, new and vibrant civic groups and new and independent newspapers began to spring up. We are seeing more private radio and television stations and more access to media and therefore to information. We are also witnessing a demonstrative increase in political activity at all levels including much greater political participation. I am proud to say that the United States has been in the forefront of the support of African civil society through our grants, through our exchange programs, and through our training.

Africans have taken the lead in bringing democracy to their countries and the United States has supported that. We have done so because it is quite clearly in our own national interest to do so. Policies that support democracy reinforce virtually all of our foreign policy objectives in Africa, as well as elsewhere.

Promoting democratic governments and accountability and the rule of law, for example, fosters the kind of enabling environment that the U.S. private sector requires to do business and indeed that is essential for the development of indigenous private sectors and economic growth.

Each year the American taxpayers spend quite literally millions of dollars for costly humanitarian relief operations. Yet, strengthening democratic institutions is an important means of resolving social and economic problems and conflicts peacefully. Therefore, supporting these institutions is far more cost-effective than paying the bill for the results of conflict.

The United States has made a significant contribution over the decades to economic development in Africa in terms of population programs, literacy programs, and child survival programs. But the democracy programs, particularly those programs that develop civil society, we support, complement and enrich these development activities because they focus on civic participation and on citizen responsibility.

We have worked to promote democracy in Africa and we have also learned a great many lessons. Certainly promoting democracy is not just one discrete activity; it is accomplished in a variety of

different ways and it is linked very closely to our other objectives. It is a long-term proposition and we are likely to witness both successes and setbacks along the way. For that reason I believe we must be patient and take advantage of the opportunities as they arise and be ready to work with different groups—governments, legislatures, parliaments, civic associations, judiciary, the press, the private sector, and first and most of all, civic groups.

I think, importantly, we must stay engaged when the going gets tough, as it will and has already in places like Liberia, Rwanda and Burundi. We must see our efforts through in places like Angola and Mozambique which have already made significant progress toward democratic transitions. And we must maintain the pressure on countries like Nigeria and Zaire, to make good on the commitments they have made to elections.

Ultimately the success of democracy in Africa depends on Africans themselves. But at this point in history the United States, I believe, has a unique opportunity to help these people form the institutions and the leaders they need to create the change that they and we are seeking on the continent.

In the past 2 years we have seen countries like South Africa, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Benin, Mali, Angola, and Senegal adopt a good neighbor policy in order to counter coups and help restore democracy in their neighboring African countries, and I think we too need a good neighbor policy for Africans who are seeking democracy.

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Moose appears in the appendix.]

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. In your statement you had said that there were 23 countries that you would classify as democracies.

What are the criteria that you apply in determining whether a country is democratic or not, and do you believe that each of these 23 countries, then, meet most of this criteria?

Mr. MOOSE. I think the basic criteria is that people in those societies have a genuine opportunity to participate actively in the political life of the country and certainly elections are a key to that participation. They have a genuine and a real choice as they approach elections and decisions about their lives.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. So opportunity, choice?

Mr. MOOSE. Opportunity and choice. And I think very closely associated with that are clearly those things are meaningless if there is not fundamental basic respect for human rights and particularly freedom of association, freedom of expression, and the right to express one's views over a range of political issues.

Those 23 countries I have listed, one can certainly point to examples of problems that have arisen in the practice of democracy in those countries. I think one of the things we look to is whether countries are making progress, whether they are moving in the right direction. I think you have to recognize in many cases those countries have started from very different points of departure, and it is unrealistic to expect that all of them are going to be at the same level of sophistication in terms of the evolution of democratic society.

But one of the criteria we try to look at is whether there is movement, progress. Is there continued effort on the part of government and others to expand the opportunities for participation by people in those societies? And the 23 that we have listed are countries which we would argue meet those criteria.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Freedom House classifies only 8 countries in Africa as being free. Why is there such a sharp contrast between your assessment and that of other experts?

Mr. MOOSE. I think, and I know I don't mean to speak on behalf of Freedom House here, I think Freedom House uses and for reasons that I can well understand, a uniform, absolute standard across the board which says they would have us compare the society of Benin, for example, with the state of evolution in our own society and parts of Europe.

That is not an unfair criteria to hold as the objective and is what we are seeking for African countries. The criteria that we had used in discerning and deciding how to categorize these various countries, I think is a less ambitious one, but I think an important one. It does acknowledge progress that has been, and is being made, and particularly when it comes to the holding of elections.

These 23 countries that we have listed here are countries that within the last 5 or 6 years have undergone elections which have been observed by international as well as business observers, and those observers have judged those election processes were fair and free in the sense of giving people an opportunity to participate and giving them a reasonable choice.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. But the standards for democracy are lower in Africa?

Mr. MOOSE. I certainly wouldn't say they are lower. I would say the standard we have used here in defining these 23 countries as being functional democracies is a standard that recognizes significant progress those societies have made over—

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. From where they were before to where they are now. So the progress they have made in that time rather than comparing them to the U.S. or European models?

Mr. MOOSE. Precisely.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Is Ghana on your list of democracies?

Mr. MOOSE. Ghana is on our list.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. As you know from one of the next panelists, he describes the government there as, and he uses the phrase "a reign of terror". Another one describes it as an authoritarian regime that has stifled democratic progress and suppressed freedom of the press.

What is the State Department's response to that kind of classification for a country that our government lists as democratic?

Mr. MOOSE. I certainly cannot share that assessment of Ghana's practice with respect to either its permission of free speech or free press. That said, I think we are all cognizant that there have been issues of concern to us and to others. For example, in Ghana within the last months, there have been detentions of two journalists and those detentions did cause a serious concern about the Government of Ghana's commitment to free press and speech. There are allegations made with respect to those arrests that the journalists in

question exceeded their rights in terms of passing on as truth allegations that have not been confirmed.

My basic observation about Ghana, however, is that over the last several years, with considerable participation and support from the United States, I would add, we have seen an evolution toward greater participation by political groups in the society. There is a very important test coming up this year because Ghana is slated to have its second national election.

We have made it clear in our discussions with governmental authorities in Ghana that this will be an important event in terms of our own assessment of Ghana's progress.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. In 8 of the 22 countries that are having first-time elections, the ruling dictator or party first came to power by violent means, somehow won the election, and now claims to have been democratically elected. When an incumbent dictator wins an election in Africa, how is it possible for us to claim that that country has become a democracy?

Mr. MOOSE. I think one has to judge it in terms of whether other competing candidates have had a reasonable opportunity to participate in that process. There is always an advantage, frankly, and particularly in African societies, to those who are in power, and those who are an incumbent.

One of the things we look at very closely is the extent to which an effort has been made to create a level playing field. That level playing field can be measured in very specific ways. One of the ways is the extent to which opposition parties have access to media and opportunity to express their views.

One measurement clearly is the extent to which a party in opposition experiences harassment or obstruction on the part of governmental authorities or the extent to which the government fails to protect them from harassment on the part of others.

So the outcome is not, I think, determined by whether the party in power perpetuates or extends its power. It is the question of whether that process by which that result has been achieved and has been judged to have been fair and free, that is to say, the extent to which that playing field can be judged to have been level.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Another item for consideration is, of course, the role of the free press. How important is that in establishing which countries do or do not have a democratic system of government, and of those that you list, how many do you believe have a genuinely free press?

Mr. MOOSE. I think the issue of freedom of the press is central to any judgment on whether an election is, in fact, free and fair, because the press tends to be the primary vehicle for expression and for information of the public of the views of the various candidates.

I think we probably spend more time in our advocacy in our discussions with governments on this issue of freedom of press than we do on any other. Our effort has been aimed in two ways. One is pressing for a liberalization of press because in many countries across Africa the fact is that the press remains very much controlled by government, and that is certainly true of the electronic media of television and radio.

One of the important evolutions I think we have seen over the last several years is the proliferation in several countries of non-government private radio stations. That is, to our thinking, one of the greatest assurances that there will be access to freedom.

The other thing to press for, even in those countries where the media remain either owned or operated by government, are for some defined policies which will assure political candidates and political parties of fair access to those media. This became a major issue for us, for example, in Senegal in 1993 to ensure that there was freedom of access. But simply to reiterate, clearly this is a central issue to any evaluation of whether an electoral process can be judged fairly.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. And related to that important element of democratic society is the free flow of information.

What programs do we have for assisting small businesses and others who want to invest in the business of printing, of publishing, of broadcasting, and other informational technologies, and are such businesses eligible for AID assistance? Don't these businesses produce job opportunities and economic growth like the others? So we should certainly have an opportunity?

Mr. MOOSE. We have, in fact, over the years through various programs, and I think principally through the U.S. Information Agency, provided some assistance to independent media to enable them to operate. It is an area of some delicacy because it is an area that sometimes can involve decisions about which media are the appropriate ones to operate. In Senegal, for example, we were able to make an arrangement where a group of independent newspapers was able to share in the facilities of a printing operation and thereby all of them having access to printing capabilities.

Certainly we have credit programs for small businesses in many countries across Africa. That has been a major effort on the part of USAID, and there is nothing that restricts independent media from taking advantage of those.

I think the major effort is in the training we have provided over the years of the independent media community, and for the government media, to the extent that we were sure that government media was committed to a policy of open access to all citizens.

Most of that training has been carried out by USIA over the years, and one of my concerns at the moment is that with the impact of budget cuts on USIA that we may be less able to provide that kind of critical training both for journalists as well as for the managers and operators of the independent media.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. One last question, the judicial system. How many of those countries on your list have a genuine independent and effective judiciary and do we have any kind of a program to provide assistance for strengthening the independent judicial system in those countries?

Mr. MOOSE. I think it would be fair to say that in every one of those countries there are concerns about how one assures and reinforces the independence of the judiciary. And to that end, increasing focuses of our efforts over the last several years has been what we can do to help train jurists and to help governments structure their judiciaries in ways that would ensure or better ensure that judicial independence.

But this is an area of institutional development that is going to require a lot more thought and attention and probably a lot more resources, not simply ours. First and foremost, we would argue that since an independent judiciary is a key element for the functioning of a democratic society, it is incumbent upon governments to see that some investment is being made toward those institutions. Where that is happening, I believe, there is a contribution we and others can make in enforcing those efforts.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. Johnston.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

Mr. Secretary, the Chair pointed out that I was in Benin and I would like to say that was an interesting election too, and as she said, the wrong person won but I have to compliment our Ambassador Yates here. He was very good in his dealing with President Soglo in convincing him at times, because he had his doubts. There was also a very, very independent constitutional court there. I never thought I would ever say that some courts are too proactive, but this one was very proactive going from precinct to precinct.

I would like to talk about two countries, if I may. One, as the Chair mentioned in her opening statement and you mentioned in your testimony, is the country of Niger. I had met and all of us had met President Ousmane, and we are very distressed by the coup there.

In talking, however, to some of the people from the Peace Corps that drifted south to Benin and also NDI, they seem to think first it was a bloodless coup to a great extent. Second, that the President had currently reached the Peter Principle as often happens in politics and that it was probably a situation of ethics to remove him, take over, and now they are in the process of having a free and open election very soon.

Could you comment on that? I am just getting an observation of people there and I would like to know how the State Department feels.

Mr. MOOSE. I think I visited Niger a year and a half ago and at that time it was evident there was a major constitutionality crisis, and the way in which the existing confused structure of powers between the Presidency and the Prime Minister was almost a prescription for deadlock.

Regrettably and notwithstanding the encouragement of ourselves and many others to the leadership, the present Prime Minister, the head of the Parliament, the leadership simply found itself incapable of overcoming that difficulty. There were a number of suggestions as to how that might happen but it didn't. There was clearly a fundamental flaw in how that process was structured but that flaw could have, and should have, been overcome in some other constitutional or political way.

The military, seeing this impasse of almost 2 years resolved itself to intervene in order to fix Parliament. Our official view, is, notwithstanding the difficulties in that transition, the intervention of the military was not justified. If you accept the principle of military intervention, that means that any time there is a serious political problem there is rationale and there is reason for the military to intervene.

The example of this in Niger sent shudders throughout the region because democratically elected governments and leaders feared the coup could send a signal to other militaries in other conflicts that any time there is a problem, coups were justified.

Mr. JOHNSTON. There was that fear in Benin, too.

Mr. MOOSE. Right. One of the reasons we urged, in the immediate aftermath of the coup, that there be a restoration of the legally constituted authorities, starting with Parliament, was to help counter that thinking. It is quite clear, however, the reality is that nobody, including the leadership themselves, the President and Prime Minister, nobody wants to go back to that because it is a recreation of the impasse that existed before.

Confronted with that reality, the position we have taken is that it is urgent for the military leadership to honor the commitment they have made for a rapid return to democracy. And to that end, we have pressed and encouraged them to accelerate the timetable that they initially proposed. And, indeed, they have shortened that timetable rather considerably, to call for a referendum on a new constitution or revised constitution as of the middle of June, followed by elections for President and Parliament in September.

We have said that, frankly, given our own legal restrictions, we are not in a position to resume our full bilateral assistance or our support in multilateral institutions for assistance or programs to endure until such time as there is measurable progress toward that restoration of democracy.

There is reason to be encouraged, because up until now, the military leadership has in fact respected the timetable that they have set up and given us and others repeated assurances to do so.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Let me throw in one other country here, and just an observation of the Chair there. Congressmen Payne, Hastings and myself were in Ghana less than 2 years ago—

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Are what?

Mr. JOHNSTON. When we were in Ghana, an English-speaking country, the press there was freer than it is in the United States, even more irresponsible in its criticism of Jerry Roth and his wife, and I was just amazed at what they did there.

The 23 countries—we will probably all go down and cross-examine you on a particular country. Let me list your criteria: fair and free, functioning democracy, genuine opportunity to participate, choice, and respect for human rights, and making progress.

Is Ethiopia one of the 23 countries?

Mr. MOOSE. I would argue that it is. And that is not to argue that there aren't serious problems that have concerned us and others about Ethiopia's democracy, but I would argue it is making progress.

Mr. JOHNSTON. In the last 24 months?

Mr. MOOSE. In the last 24 months, I would regard the election that occurred last year, which elected the new government, as being significantly improved over the first elections that occurred in 1992, if my memory serves me.

Mr. JOHNSTON. They had choice?

Mr. MOOSE. Choice is a difficult thing, because one of the problems in Ethiopia, and the problem that we encountered across the government, is that there are many parties that decide not to par-

icipate. It makes it very difficult to test if the system is going to work for them or against them. We had urged many of the opposition groups to test that proposition. And the only way to judge whether they would be treated fairly and freely is if they had done so, but regrettably, they did not. I can't add to that.

Mr. JOHNSTON. There are still almost 2,000 people in jail. They have more political prisoners in jail than I think the balance of Africa combined. I am sure Master Cohen would contest that figure. They are still in jail. They have not been charged.

When I was there in August of last year, 12 journalists were arrested summarily without charge. I think they are still in jail. When it comes to freedom of press, I am sure we can all nitpick you on the thing. Relatively speaking, there are huge leaps forward, I can see that.

Mr. MOOSE. I will have to get an update myself on the fate of those journalists. It continues to be a great concern to us that most of those people that were contained were detained in connection with their alleged crimes, and sometimes crimes of inhumanity, under the regime.

It is still, however, not acceptable that 4-5 years after their arrest that they, in many cases, are still in detention. It is a major issue for us in our discussions with the Ethiopians. As part of that discussion, I think we need to find out what we can do to assist in the prosecutions, just as we have in other cases.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Has the National Democratic Institute been expelled from the country?

Mr. MOOSE. My understanding, and if I can go back and refresh my memory of this particular issue, the National Democratic Institute (NDI) did encounter difficulties with the government but NDI was not expelled from Ethiopia. We have supported NDI in its discussions with the government on what we believe are fair or open procedures under which NDI could operate. And we also argue, from the government's point of view, it is important that they have independent observers that can comment on the progress or lack thereof that is taking place in Ethiopia's progress.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Thank you very much.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Secretary, is it possible to get a copy of that sheet?

Mr. MOOSE. Yes, indeed, I will be happy to show you that.

[Moose handed list of countries to the Chair.]

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you.

Mr. Houghton.

Mr. HOUGHTON. Mr. Secretary, good to see you here. The subject of this hearing is "Democratic Elections: Myth or Reality". The elections are obviously important, but the follow-up to ensure the stability of those elections are extremely important, because you want democracy and freedom not to be poor, but to increase your personal property and your security, and what have you.

You have mentioned the examples of some countries that by what they have done have been an example for other countries to—lets say, Niger, so the idea of being the signal to other countries if things don't go well, flip back.

Is it possible to take a handful of more successful democracies and build on that? As many times in educational institutions, you

build on the strongest, not the weakest, because if you contribute money to the weakest, it will go just to the weak. If you give to the strongest, then everyone else will have to come up. So that there are examples where people say, look at what a strong democracy has done.

Now, what do we do in this particular case? How do we help?

You referred to the issue that sufficient aid wasn't coming to the African continent. What specifically should this committee or other committees involved in this area do to be able to help you and create those little jewel-like examples of successes so people could say, look what happens?

Now, I have had many representatives from African Governments come into my office and they talk jobs, and they talk investment, but many times these people are trained politically or legally or even been in the military, they don't know what it is to attract investment. Is there any way we can help in that regard?

It is not just the money, I am sure that is important for the U.S. Government, but also the involvement of individual private firms through the political stability in those countries, and they are willing to put money in, invest, use the assets of that nation, then for your purposes and ours, create an example which will offset the Niger's?

Mr. MOOSE. Those are excellent questions, Congressman Houghton. Let me start with the first one of should we, can we, focus our assistance in ways that enhance the prospect of success? As in your examples, where people have made a commitment and where prospects for things going well—a point of fact, is that we do that.

There is a process of almost natural selection here. AID in particular, seeks to target its money in those places where we think there is a good reason to be hopeful. And part of that recipient environment for which we are looking is one that creates hope and prospect for governments seriously committed to democratic process and democratic reform.

We have had any number of examples that I can cite over the years, where we focused on economic activities and development to the exclusion of political framework and context.

All of that investment was lost precisely because the political system failed, and in so failing, brought down all of the economic infrastructure that we had been working so hard to buttress. So I think as we assess where it is we are going to make our effort, it is in those countries which have demonstrated a real commitment to reform, both political and economic.

At the same time, though, I think it is important that we reserve some part of our effort and/or energy for those countries which are not yet at that stage, which are still struggling. First, because I think it is important that we demonstrate a commitment to democracy wherever it happens to be, whether within countries where the governments are still resisting democratic change or whether they are in the Benins and Senegals of Africa. So somehow or another we need to find the means to encourage and promote democracy, both where it is succeeding, and where it is not yet successful.

We have now seen over the last 6 or 7 years this movement toward democracy. This, I think has been enhanced by the end of the cold war, and has released a constraint on people to experiment

and to engage in democracy. One of my concerns, frankly, is just at the moment when that effort, an effort that we have done a great deal to encourage and support, is beginning to take hold, we find that we are unable to support and sustain that transition at appropriate and necessary levels.

And my concern is that if there are failures in these 23 countries or in others, that people will associate these failures with democratic transition. Democracy will get a bad name precisely because the accompanying environment is not there.

So I am concerned that we are reducing our capacity to support these countries precisely at the moment they are making this very courageous decision and most need our support. But I do agree with you also, that one of the ways—one of the things—that we could do that would be most supportive of these democratic transitions would be to find ways to enhance prospects for economic growth, and economic growth through the private sector.

Secretary Brown just 2½ months ago took off and went to Africa for 10 days; I had the privilege of accompanying him. The purpose of the trip was to try to stimulate, to encourage those efforts that African Governments are making to make their environments, more hospitable, more attractive, to private investment—both indigenous private investment and international private investment. I think there is a lot more we could do here.

I welcome the initiative of Congressman McDermott, for example, for us to take a more focused approach to how we relate our trade and commercial activities to our development strategies for Africa. I think there is a lot we can do in that regard. But all of that, too, requires means and capacity on our part. In many cases, it is resources to support the efforts and initiatives that we would like.

Mr. HOUGHTON. Thank you.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Houghton.

Mr. Payne.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much, Mrs. Chairman, Mr. Secretary. Let me just say that I agree that if we look at democracy in the state that we see here in this country after several hundred years of trying to work it out, we could certainly be critical of some of these newly emerging African democracies. I think we have to keep in mind that it really wasn't until 1965 that African-Americans in the South could vote.

As a matter of fact, at that time, there were only 280 African-American-elected officials in the country in 1965, but with the change in the legislation, in the Voting Rights Act, we now have about 8,500 African-Americans elected to office. You can see they are still striving for a more perfect Union.

And I suppose if we keep that same framework in mind as we look at the struggling new democracies attempting, you know, there never would have been even if we criticize the Presidents of Uganda or Ghana, there were never times when you took over by force and allowed elections. You just stayed in until someone took you over and/or you just continued to rule by force.

So I think that to see a transition where people who took over by force have allowed the public, perhaps not as fair as some want—but when you look at Ghana with the privatization of some

of the natural resources, with the stock market, the whole question that Mr. Houghton brought up, there would be some follow-up, in addition to democracy, some of the economic benefits should come out.

Let me just say, finally, there is violence, there is interference, in some of the countries on your list. But it is just like us concluding that in the United States of America intimidation is used and therefore elections are not free. For example, if we take the rash of burnings of black churches; there have been over 22 since January 1, 1996. At that rate, there will be 100 black churches burned in the rural South. That is an intimidation. That is telling you we don't like you, don't get too active, don't do voter registration, don't participate.

I think it would be wrong to conclude in the United States in the South, in rural Tennessee, Alabama and Mississippi, where things are happening, that no election is fair and free. It means there is intimidation, that we hopefully can get to the bottom of it. But I just say that in the context that as we review, I don't think we should lessen standards, but I think we ought to try to err on the part of progress as opposed to an empirical straight line of all "T's" being crossed and "I's" being dotted.

Let me just ask the question, how closely is there cooperation between USAID and NED, and is NED doing more of the democracy building, and if so, is it possible that USAID could allocate additional resources? We know resources are tighter and tighter each year, but additional resources for nation-building, democracy, and are you working together on that issue?

Mr. MOOSE. I don't know that I can speak authoritatively, Congressman Payne, about the type of cooperation that exists between NED and AID, but I know for a fact that it does exist. There are things obviously I think that NED can do which are difficult or sometimes awkward or uncomfortable for governmental institutions to do.

It is possible for NED, for example, to be more directly involved in supporting elements of civil society, particularly in difficult political situations, than it is for AID often to do this. So I think there is the kind of complementarity here between the efforts that NED makes and those of others.

The question of how much resources AID can devote to democracy, as opposed to other programs, is an ongoing dialog between the State Department and my office and AID. But we recognize that we need to make an investment; we have evidence of how that investment contributes to a whole range of our policy objectives, including our development objectives in many African countries.

But I think there is also recognition in AID as there is in the State Department, that there needs to be balance in what we are pursuing. You can't pursue democracy to the exclusion, for example, of development and economic growth, because you have no underpinning.

So the constant discussion that we have in any given situation concerns the appropriate mix or balance of the kinds of programs we are pursuing. In the last year I regret to say that, because of reductions in budget, our overall commitment through AID for democracy-building and also through our other funding mechanisms,

and the programs of other agencies, including USIA has been reduced. In fiscal year 1995, AID's bilateral development program devoted some \$80 million to democracy programs in Africa. That figure for fiscal year 1996 is going to fall to about \$60 million precisely because of the competition for scarce resources.

So we need to sustain our investment in democracy, but we also need to do it as part of the comprehensive balanced approach strategy for development meeting our development challenges and needs at the same time.

Mr. PAYNE. Just quickly, could you tell me what went wrong in Liberia, what is going on in Nigeria, but finally—

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Very briefly.

Mr. PAYNE. My time is almost out.

And finally, sort of in keeping with the State statement, the Chairlady said how in the world do you get Zaire on the transition list, I am just curious?

Mr. MOOSE. Liberia is a source of great pain and frustration for all of us because we have invested a lot of energy and time and resources over the last 3 years in support of the effort to first negotiate and then implement the peace strategy. We thought last fall that this offered a new opportunity and a different opportunity to try to achieve that. Our special envoy has been deeply involved in that.

There are three elements that I think are critical here. No amount of external coercion or support is going to make a difference, and it is as yet undemonstrated that there is sufficient will on the part of leaders to enable this to work.

Second, the peacekeeping component of this has been a critical one. While we would have to say, in fairness, that this never was a perfect peacekeeping mission, it certainly has the promise to carry out its end of bargain.

But we have seen for a variety of reasons a dissolution of ECOMOG in its capabilities as such as to endanger the peace process.

The third element is our own support. Indeed, I think we have provided considerable support over the years. I think the question we need to ask ourselves now is if there is a reasonable prospect of getting peace back on track, what kind of commitment will be needed from us and others in that process. The essential factor here was, I think in the first instance, the continuing competition among the various faction leaders for preeminence. That triggered the renewal, the resumption of violence in Monrovia and has led to the situation that we now see.

On Zaire, if I might just quickly add, Zaire is a case where we have a government that has made certain commitments or undertakings with regard to the election process. It has moved very slowly, but there has been movement. The most significant movement recently has been in the creation of the naming of independent or electoral commission which is going to be charged with organizing these elections.

Our view is that we need to encourage and support that electoral process. But, frankly, organizing elections in a country the size of Zaire is going to require a monumental effort not unlike the effort undertaken in South Africa, or more recently, in Mozambique. The

effort is going to require a total international support, not just the United States, to make it happen.

If, indeed, we can continue to see progress, I think we will look for ways to increase our own involvement in that preparation. An election must happen sooner or later, and we would hope sooner. The process of building toward that election is important for enabling other groups in Zaire to begin to emerge and assert their own political voice. We support that objective.

Mr. PAYNE. We will forget Nigeria, because we don't have enough time, so I yield to my colleagues.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Payne.

Mr. Hastings.

Mr. HASTINGS. Thank you.

Mr. Secretary, let me thank you and your staffers, interrelated agencies, for doing the work you do on behalf of the United States of America in Africa and interrelated countries. I think it is extremely important in this era of budgetary constraints that we continuously recognize the rather extraordinary work that the various agencies working in Africa do with the limited resources to undertake to do it.

It is one thing for us to advocate what ought be done, it is another thing for us to then come around and oppose those things that might enhance resources in order that you may be able to do those things that we want done. I just want to say that.

The other thing, building on Congressman Houghton's suggestion, it has long been a theory of mine that we should reward success in Africa. And too often, and I wish to cite the *too*—and this is not in the nature of a question, nor am I seeking a response—too often we in Niger, for example, \$1 million there would have made the difference in continuing democracy despite the perceived electoral problems that may have existed in the distinction between the Presidency and the Parliament.

\$250,000 in Djibouti, a little country that we owe a lot to, and yet they are not a democracy in that sense. Perhaps they are in transition, but \$250,000 there would have made and would make an immense difference in their attitude about the United States and the potential for us moving them in the direction of democracy.

In Benin, had we done the same thing in Benin that we do in other countries when President Soglo assumed the mantle and assumed the process of democratization and economic liberalization, had we taken trade missions there and encouraged investors, Soglo would be President today.

Let me tell you how we get fast when we want to get fast. Let's turn to Bosnia. The week before last a significant number of countries came together and leveraged \$1.5 billion for redevelopment in Bosnia, for infrastructure and governmental institutions and for investment purposes.

I am not hostile toward that effort. As a matter of fact, I participated in making sure that that effort came about. But if one believes there is going to be democracy in Bosnia overnight, then I have a bridge in Florida I am prepared to sell. Democracy is at best uncertain in Bosnia. But we rallied the rest of the countries around the world to do what we want to do. We never rally for the African continent in that sense. It is always piecemeal. It is always last on

the list. And enough of that already, for us to come here then and to be judgmental, for example, about Uganda, that has done economic liberalization more than China would under ordinary circumstances, and yet we want to tell Museveni how he should conduct his elections. Would de Tocqueville could be alive and come back and go to Africa and give us some judgments as he did with reference to this country development of democracy that leaves and still leaves some things to be desired.

If I sound a bit hostile, it is not toward you, Mr. Secretary. It is perhaps toward this institution that is too damn judgmental as it pertains to how other people ought to develop in their countries.

We don't know what it is to have tribal wars. We know what it is to have racial conflict. We don't know what it is to try to govern a country, as many African leaders have had to do, after having the kinds of serious tribal disputes that have killed countless thousands, millions of people, then you would have them come in, and in the morning they are supposed to have democracy and a preamble. We need Thomas Jefferson all over again then in order to be able to accomplish this end result.

The question I put more seriously is how well, Mr. Secretary, are the efforts of the United States coordinated with other countries, France, for example, in the Francophone area, the Dutch or the English and everybody else that meddled in Washington? I am going to leave the multinational corporations and international corporations alone because, you know something, they don't give a damn about whether or not there is democracy or not. They are going to do business in Africa. Ask Shell Oil are they doing business in Nigeria today. Big time. It doesn't matter which government is in power, who is in jail, who killed whom. They are there and we know that.

All I am saying is let's get busy trying to figure out what it is we can do in a reasonable manner within the budgetary constraints that you are confronted with in your agencies. And one thing it seem to me we can do better than we are doing is coordinate all of the world's efforts toward the kinds of democratization we would envision.

If I offended anybody, it was deliberate.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Hastings.

Mr. MOOSE. Let me say a couple of things. As I said earlier, I think one of the great concerns that we have now is that indeed we are seeing the fruits of our prior efforts and investments in Africa. I know Benin very well. I served there in the mid-1980's at a time when Benin was just beginning to chart its course toward democracy.

The United States has been in the forefront in encouraging democracy in the African continent. We did so out of our concern for Africa and out of our own interests as well. It does concern me that at the moment when that investment is now beginning to bear fruit, that we don't have the means available to us to sustain and support that effort.

Mr. HASTINGS. Exactly.

Mr. MOOSE. And that is a matter of concern.

Second, it is an area where you are talking about modest investment. Our support for Sierra Leone was on the order of \$.5 million

for the election process. But that half million dollars was significant in terms of its contribution to the election's process. But for our contributions and others similar in magnitude, it wouldn't have happened.

Now we face an even more daunting challenge, particularly at a time when our resources are tight; how do we now help to consolidate this remarkable achievement that has just been carried out? That is the concern.

Your specific question is indeed very pertinent, because increasingly it is not only the United States, unfortunately, that is confronted with a variety of budgetary pressures that have resulted in declining contributions, but it is also our European partners and others, where in many cases, they have been in the past historically much more active and involved than we have.

But the net flow to Africa at the moment is negative, it is down, that is true, in the private sector and public contributions. Therefore, it is all the more incumbent that we spend our time and effort trying to better coordinate that effort.

Brian Atwood has spent a great amount of time, wooing with our European partners, with Japan, with the European Union, which remains one of the key players, and trying to assure to the best of our ability that what resources that are available are being directed in ways that are most productive, that we are avoiding competition in what we are doing.

That is particularly true at the bilateral level. We have very effective partnerships with our development partners in places like Kenya and places like Mozambique, and it is where we try to both enhance our leverage but also to magnify the impact of our resources.

So it is a very pertinent question, and I think there is more that can be done and should be done.

Mr. HASTINGS. I thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you.

Mr. Campbell.

Mr. CAMPBELL. I am sorry I wasn't able to be here for the earlier statements. Mr. Secretary, if the answers to my questions were already stated, I will be very happy to check the record and just tell me if they were.

I want to begin with a commendation of your Department, and of your office within the Department particularly; I saw their work firsthand over the last 2 weeks. You are in a difficult situation, managing with limited resources, I think very, very well. And I want to commend your office particularly, in preparing me and my wife for our trip and the work that you did to make that a profitable and productive one for us in Kenya and South Africa.

From my visit to Kenya and South Africa over the break, I have two questions on Kenya. I met with members of the opposition as well as the President. And in meeting with the members of the opposition, the suggestion was offered by one of them that there be a neutral evaluation of the democratic institutions of Kenya by a credible outside force outside of government, even possibly the former President Jimmy Carter Center for Democracy, possibly the United Nations, which would allow for the world's view to be

brought to bear, the intensity of scrutiny to be brought to bear on the upcoming elections.

There will be elections before the end of 1997. And the leaders of the opposition were concerned that they did not have access to radio and television, that what access they had to newspapers was limited, that there had been persecutions and prohibitions of mass meetings, and so the suggestion I thought was a very good one, and I wanted to hear what response you might have to it.

What sort of a neutral evaluative mechanism might we bring to bear that would not have a counterproductive result?

And my second and last question regards South Africa. There is \$600 million, over a 3-year program, including a component for assistance with organized labor, AFL-CIO in particular, was involved I know in assisting with the formation of labor unions. With the election of President Mandela accomplished and from all that I could tell and learn, a remarkably successful achievement of that country moving toward a fair one-person, one-vote system, the question occurs to me is whether the kind of aid to assist in the formation of labor unions is necessary or appropriate?

And I would focus particularly on that, because there are some reasonable economists, as least in one school of thought, who would question whether that would be the most productive investment for an emerging economic colossus, by African standards, which is what South Africa is.

Those are the two questions I would like responses to, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. MOOSE. Thank you, Mr. Campbell.

On the question of Kenya, certainly without getting into the specifics of what form this might take, but the notion of having independent outside participation and evaluation of the election process is something we have supported in many countries across the continent.

We have done our own assessment. There have been, in other countries, both advisors as well as observers in helping governments and parties identify problems, or likely problems in the electoral process. And certainly I would support in principle that notion. Obviously, it is a question of what form that it takes. It is something that the parties themselves in the government—

Mr. CAMPBELL. Let me interrupt to ask you if there have been any preliminary discussions with the Carter Center, for example?

Mr. MOOSE. I don't believe we have had discussions about the 1997 Kenyan elections with the Carter Center and there is nothing to rule that out, but certainly that is a good suggestion.

Mr. CAMPBELL. To your knowledge, no other organization. So the concept is OK but I would like to pursue that possibly with you on another question. Thank you.

Mr. MOOSE. I would like an opportunity to inform myself a little bit better on what AID intends to do but as a general principal we have found our work with African labor unions across the continent has contributed to the development of responsible labor unions, and that responsibility both in political terms, but also in economic terms, has been important as a basis for industrialization in African economic growth and development.

In my experience in Senegal when I was there, the labor union was a major element in any negotiation on how one improved the environment for investment. It was a major part. It had to be in both political and legal terms, to any renegotiation. Much of the effort we made, therefore, with the labor unions in Senegal was aimed at, if you will, educating them as to the appropriate and responsible role of the labor union in those kinds of negotiations.

I do think that the change that was adopted by the Parliament would not have been possible but for some kind of continuing interaction between the labor unions, ourselves and other outsiders—

Mr. CAMPBELL. Could you help me understand? There is one reference I am ignorant of. You mentioned an investment code and there was a legal requirement that there be a labor component, could you inform me about that, please?

Mr. MOOSE. I think, as in the case in many countries—

Mr. CAMPBELL. Domestic law.

Mr. MOOSE [continuing]. Domestic law required that any changes in these major elements of economic policy and economic law, that there be participation in that discussion.

Mr. CAMPBELL. I thought you were referring to America. Thank you for clarifying that.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you.

Mr. Campbell, we would like to hear about your trip at a later time, thank you.

Mr. Frazer.

Mr. FRAZER. Thank you.

Mr. Secretary, I, too, would like to thank you for your continued work in Africa. Many of the questions I wanted to ask focus on an area Mr. Hastings mentioned which is an apparent lack of concern by this institution for Africa as opposed to almost breakneck pace in places like Bosnia. I am not saying anything is wrong with Bosnia, but it seems there is a perception that the continent of Africa is off our radar screen. Does that perception affect your Department's ability to marshal resources necessary to continue to work with what you started in places like Benin?

Mr. MOOSE. Without commenting on the first part of your question, I think, as we said before, we have a real concern about resources. We do have a concern about how we respond to the opportunities that we ourselves create.

I would say to you that from my conversations with my counterparts around the Department, Latin America and Asia, we are not the only ones who are affected by this constraint, but I do think that perhaps because of the particular stage of development that Africa is in, because it is now this particular period, that we are seeing this enormous progress toward democratization. That there is call, there is reason to look at how we can best support that transition. I am concerned, as I indicated earlier, about what the consequence would be should we fail to be responsive to this transition.

It is unfortunate that this transition is occurring at a time when, for a variety of other reasons, we seem to be preoccupied with other issues of finance and budget. But I do think there are a variety of ways through which we can approach our support for transition to democracy.

The budget proposal which Secretary Christopher has now outlined for the Foreign Affairs Committee is a budget that would adequately cover our needs in Africa if we obtain those resources. There are several critical components. There is the Development Fund for Africa which is the bilateral assistance, but beyond that there are some other key elements, one of which is our continuing support for the World Bank, and for particularly the soft loan window of the World Bank, because that is the fund that has been the fundamental safety net, if you will, for African countries. Almost 50 percent of that fund is devoted to Africa.

A second component that I would highlight as being particularly important right now is our ability to grant further debt relief to the least developed countries and those countries which have made a commitment to democracy. That in itself would remove a significant burden to these countries at a time when they are struggling to find new ways to invest in the social and economic capital of their countries.

So there are a variety of elements of policy that we can use to support these countries during this period of transition, and I think we need to look at them creatively and comprehensively to make sure that we are, in fact, providing an adequate basis.

The last issue, as Congressman Hastings mentioned, we do indeed need to look at how closely we can coordinate our own efforts with those of other countries'. It is contingent that if the resources aren't there, we can't do the job.

Mr. FRAZER. One final question. We are looking at a list of democratic countries. We would like countries in Africa and elsewhere, ones which we are trying to bring into this democracy, we would like them to get there overnight, but obviously that is impossible. Do you hear from any of these countries that perhaps we are insisting that they become democratic too quickly, and that a transition really isn't possible based on your past political history?

Mr. MOOSE. We hear that a lot from many countries who suggest that we were expecting too much of them and that we need to be more understanding of the constraints on their development, both political and economic. We have to understand—and this is true uniquely in Africa that at the moment we are seeing countries simultaneously going through economic reform even while they are trying to institute democratic institutions—that create special concerns and pressures and strains on those countries.

I think in our approach to this, we have tried to be realistic. We don't go out simply to convert countries to democracy, but there are some fundamental things that are important in and of themselves which are important contributions to this evolution.

One of the things we have insisted on is basic respect for fundamental human rights. That is the bedrock on which all of these other developments rest, and that, I think, is something we should promote regardless of what countries are prepared to commit to at this particular stage.

Most countries, again, we have not been the engine, but rather the promoters and encouragers, but the real impetus for change that has taken place in these 23 countries has come from within. It has come from the need to find a way to legitimize political authority in those countries. It has come from the need, from the de-

mand of people, to have governments which are more respectful of their own rights.

One of the things; we had terrible records over the last 30 years in many African countries precisely because governments had no respect whatsoever for the basic rights of their own citizens. It has come from the demand on the part of people to really assume some greater control and greater influence over decisions that affect them, and so we are not necessarily the ones who are pushing this agenda. We are not the major impetus.

Mr. FRAZER. Thank you.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Secretary Moose, for being with us. You will be back in about a week and a half when we do our update on the Angola situation.

Mr. MOOSE. I look forward to that very much.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much.

I would like to introduce our second panel, which is headed by Ambassador Haig Cohen, the senior advisor for the Global Coalition for Africa. Ambassador Cohen has served as the Assistant Secretary of State for Africa and as special assistant for the President and senior director for Africa and the National Securities Council. He has had three decades of service at the State Department, and they are very honored for his contribution to the field of diplomacy.

He will be followed by Dr. Willie Lamoussé-Smith, who is a professor of African-American studies and sociology at the University of Maryland, Baltimore County. A native of Ghana, Dr. Lamoussé-Smith has conducted research in a wide range of conflicts and has served in various capacities at universities in Europe, Africa and the United States. Mr. Willie Lamoussé-Smith is also a national fellow in the research program for the comparative study of interview conflict in multinational states at Dartmouth College and served as a senior consultant at U.S. and international organizations.

Our third witness for this panel is Mr. Thomas Sheehy, who serves in the International Regulatory Affairs in the Freedom Foundation. Mr. Sheehy has authored and coauthored on a range of issues. He often participates as an expert witness before Congress at committees and other government panels and academic panels throughout the United States.

Mr. Sheehy has also served as an election observer for Kenya's 1992 national elections, and in Taiwan's 1995 legislative elections, and has examined U.S. peacekeeping operations in the Western Sahara area and in Mozambique.

Thank you all for being here today, and once we hear from all of our witnesses of the second panel, we will proceed with questions.

Ambassador Cohen, welcome again.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE HERMAN J. COHEN, SENIOR ADVISOR, GLOBAL COALITION FOR AFRICA

Mr. COHEN. It is a great pleasure to be here to discuss this very important subject. I have presented a statement for the record, and I will just summarize it in the interest of saving time.

To begin with, in the interest of full disclosure, I am a member of a consulting firm which does work for the Governments of An-

gola and Cote d'Ivoire, for which we are duly registered with the Justice Department.

In terms of my own perspective on democratization in Africa, I would say that I agree with Secretary Moose. In general, Africa has seen a tremendous amount of improvement over the past 5 years. I think it is not a useful argument to try to decide which country is a functioning democracy and which is not. I think the key thing is there is transition in the right direction, and I would agree with Secretary Moose's list of countries.

My own personal definition of a functioning democracy is—I would even disagree with the Freedom Foundation—I think there is only one in Africa, and that is South Africa. That is not important. What is important is that basically this transition is taking place in the right direction. I think in Africa there are more open politics now, more freedom, less repression than in the past. In fact, why are we so excited about Nigeria now is because Nigeria is such a minority in the absence of democracy. What Nigeria is now doing was commonplace in Africa 15 years ago. Now it is not commonplace anymore.

Now, why is there a mixed record? What works in transition better than other things? The Global Coalition for Africa sponsored a nine-country study on transition. These studies were done by African researchers, and we had the results at the end of last year. We have then done a synthesis of policy issues and implications. I brought two copies to give you. It is much too long to place in the record, but maybe the committee staff could make use of it. Since the U.S. Government helped finance the study, I think it is fitting that I have given you the first copy of that.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you.

Mr. COHEN. What did we conclude from that study that is useful? First of all, where you have participation of various groups in a broad spectrum of society, a transition is better and more constructive than when you don't have it. I think where we have seen some very good participation has been in Mali and Uganda, where they have had very extensive discussions before they embark on any final decisions.

Second, wherever ethnicity is specifically addressed and brought out into the open, you have a lot better transition than when ethnicity is suppressed and people try to say that is not an important issue. It always is an important issue.

Third, you need effective institutions. Civil society is necessary as a countervailing power to governmental power, and where you have civil society, as in South Africa, then your transitions are always more effective.

Also you need viable government institutions, and there I think USAID has done excellent work in improving the quality of governmental institutions. I cite an example in Ghana where AID is supporting an NGO that helps educate members of Parliament about the legislation they are voting on. Very practical work in favor of the democratic transition.

Also political parties are immature generally in Africa. There are very few parties that have real platforms. They are just interested in getting elected. It is very important that the work of the Na-

tional Endowment of Democracy continue to get some funding so they can work with political parties.

The military is very important, as we have seen in Niger and Gambia and Nigeria today. If the military is not democratized, then the country cannot be democratized. So therefore, it is very important that efforts be made to have a transition for the military as well; and therefore, I am recommending to this committee that some work should be done by the U.S. Government in that area, and I will come to that in a second.

Finally, you have the issue of good governance. Governance can be instituted faster than democracy. While Africans and their different cultural problems are being worked out in terms of what kind of democracy they want, basic good government can be instituted rapidly. That is protection of private property, sanctity of contracts, the rule of law, transparency of transactions, fairness in government, implementation of policy. This can be done quickly. It doesn't have to wait for full-fledged democracy, and I think this is important.

In fact, I think good governance is a building block of democracy, and what is happening in Ghana, Uganda and Cote d'Ivoire, they are putting in good governance much faster than democracy, and I think good governance will pull democracy behind it and pull much faster so I would not get too excited about, how shall we say, less than smooth movement toward democracy until we are talking about a level playing field. I think what is important about Uganda, is that your property is protected, your contracts are implementable, and things are moving along toward greater freedom.

OK, now what are my recommendations for the U.S. Government? First of all, I think USAID has done some good work in support of democracy. I would like to see them move a little more toward institution building and a little less toward support for elections. I think African countries are now pretty well educated to do elections. I would like to see more emphasis on institution building, like having a good judiciary that can enforce contracts.

Second, I think decentralization is very important. There is no better way of giving people the feeling they are participating if power can be decentralized as low as possible so people can have their own budgets, make their own decisions on what they are going to spend money on—building a road, digging of wells, putting up a clinic—let them make a decision instead of some distant person in a central government who has very poor communications.

The best example of decentralization that is going on in Africa today I think is in Mali, and I think the United States should take a good look at that phenomenon and support it where possible.

I would recommend support in a very modest way for the democratization of militaries, and I think this committee was a pioneer in support of conflict resolution with PL 103-381. Congressman Johnston, who had to leave, was one the leaders of that.

I think there could be some follow-on support for military democratization, and it doesn't have to take vast amounts of resources. For example, there is a school in Garmisch in Germany that is run by the U.S. Army to help democratize the armies of the CIS States. Why not have a section of that for Africa, because the U.S. Army

in Europe is responsible for all military programs in Africa except for the Horn of Africa, which is under the Central Command.

This would not take many resources to help bring Africans in and teach them what it is to be a democracy, what it is for a military to support a democracy. I would send a few military missions out to help teach African military academies what it means to be a military establishment in a democratic society. I don't think that would take very much resources.

So, in general, I would say transition is going along fairly well in Africa. There are a lot of flaws, there is a lot of backward movement, but on the whole, transition is in good shape, and I would say that the United States can make some modest contributions to that transition, and I hope there will be some resources to continue that support. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cohen appears in the appendix.]

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Ambassador.

Dr. LAMOUSÉ-SMITH. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF WILLIE B. LAMOUSÉ-SMITH, DIRECTOR OF AFRICAN AMERICAN STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND AT BALTIMORE COUNTY

Dr. LAMOUSÉ-SMITH. Thank you, Madam Chairman, for the introduction and also for the kind invitation to be here to share my assessment of the democratic elections that are taking place in Africa. I have a full statement in the record.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. We will enter it in the record if you would like to summarize.

Dr. LAMOUSÉ-SMITH. I will give you a summary of the important parts here.

The seeming suddenness with which multiparty elections have recently been held in a democratic manner in many African countries has raised questions. Are these changes a temporary aberration, or do they presage real structural reordering of political and social relations? After examination of the processes that have significantly determined and affected political developments in contemporary Africa, I reach the conclusion that the decade of the 1990's should be called Africa's decade of protodemocracy.

In the written testimony I argue that electoral processes that have begun deserve to be strengthened. I suggest some of the kinds of strategic actions that are called for in the mutual interest of the United States and Africa to maintain direction and sustain processes that are opening paths to democracy. I have examined how much of the current changes are myths and how much is real. I conclude that the current phase of Africa's protodemocracy is a foundation period for concrete actions. Policies toward realistic and achievable results must be formulated.

The 1960's were Africa's decade of independence, and all the new states drew up constitutions based on values of liberal democracy. However, Africa's first dance with democracy failed. Authoritarian regimes sprouted. Assistance from external sources helped sustain them.

The dismal failures of these regimes in halting or reversing the economic declines of their nations and creating political stability for their own peoples contributed very much to the "assault" on them.

In the second half of the 1980's, latent movements began to surface for manifest actions that have led to the current protodemocracy in Africa.

In a matter of 6 years, from 1990 to 1996, multiparty elections were successfully organized in 34 African nations.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. What years did you say?

Dr. LAMOUSE-SMITH. 1990 to 1996, the past 6 years.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. How many did you say?

Dr. LAMOUSE-SMITH. 34.

The rapidity of the changes led to exaggerations that seem to have created several myths. Among the myths were "second independence", "second liberation", "springtime of Africa", "democratic transition", "from military dictatorship to civilian, multiparty democracy", "democracy revolution". These labels do not appear to have been critically placed on the process that they were supposed to describe. Sober observers captured the changes in more realistic terms such as "democratic renewal" and "democratic reawakening".

It is important to point out that however successfully democratic methods are being used in the conduct of Africa's multiparty elections, the results of the elections by themselves are neither equal to nor do they automatically create democracy.

Notwithstanding these myths, the real outcomes of the democratically conducted multiparty elections far outweigh the myths. The outcomes have good chances of being institutionalized. With funding for technical assistance from donor countries, especially the USA, most African countries have established electoral commissions, some ensured their protection and independence by constitutional amendments. The invitation of independent international observers to monitor voting along with domestic observers has virtually become an expected feature. The integrity of the variety of technical assistance and competent communications technicians provided by an organization such as IFES has begun to restore confidence within Africa for the electoral process itself.

Occurrences of some shortcomings are inevitable at this stage of the development of Africa's new electoral processes. This is why it is vitally important that the efficient and highly effective work of USAID and IFES in the rebuilding of Africa's democratic electoral processes is strongly supported by the House of Representatives.

The transmission of technical skills in how to conduct democratic elections in Africa has opened up fundamental steps toward representative democracy. I subsume this incipient level of implanting the democratic way of life in Africa during the 1990's as Africa's decade of protodemocracy. It is a period which should increasingly be characterized by receding autocratic regimes and by the slow internalization of democratic principles, spirit and culture.

Now, to critical perspectives on electoral process and systems. The involvement of a nation's diverse publics in designing and implementing electoral systems that they find acceptable, and can identify with, is an essential condition. As diverse publics in any African country participate in the creation of their nation's electoral mechanisms, their cooperation for involvement in the process is an opportunity for strengthening trust and national unity. It is crucial to create confidence in the process.

Considering Africa's social problems, the collection of reliable census data, the registration of voters and the demarcation of electoral wards and districts are difficult but essential and require long-term engagement. The financial costs of such activities can be burdensome for most African nations.

Techniques of mass education offer a means for electoral education on a large scale. The high rates of illiteracy make education by radio a most effective way of reaching the electorate in any country. The monopolization of media in most African countries by the governments hampers electoral processes in many obvious ways, not the least of which is targeted disinformation. Needed are services of an independent "Radio Free Africa", broadcasting accurate and disinterested information on the practice and value of democracy. This will discourage disinformation from all sides and promote confidence.

Democratizing Africa's electoral processes, as implemented and managed by organizations working with the USAID, has had more successes than failures. The organizations have acquired experiences from different nations on the continent. They recognize variabilities in local conditions and the need to refine methodologies to meet local requirements. However, the application of the standard "free and fair" to election results remains problematic.

On the outlook for the future; that is, transitions to democracy. Will democracy be viable in Africa? What kind of democracy for Africa?

Africa's history of the past 35 years can assure us that the growth and maturing of democracy in Africa will take time.

After the unsuccessful experimentation with socialism, and the failures of personalized autocracies, the only form of government in the world that has a wide accommodative base and a broad appeal among ordinary Africans is the kind of democracy with which they have some acquaintanceship, that is, the Western liberal type.

The second generation of Presidential and Parliamentary elections during this decade is taking place in some countries. Each completed election is progress toward democracy. Just as external pressures and technical assistance motivated African leaders to be responsive to their own people, the USA should not let up yet.

How do we assure that the protodemocracy does not slide back? While the outlook for democratic elections is promising, the time has come to add civic education. Additionally, we should remember that a starving person will certainly not consider discussions on democracy a priority. It is in the interest of the USA to implement the kinds of assistance programs that will enable Africans to grow jobs lest poverty drives the hungry into camps of antidemocratic militants and/or narco-terrorists.

The record of the USAID and organizations such as IFES, ARD, AAI and the Carter Center in laying foundations for democracy in Africa is one of which we can all be proud. Thank you.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Doctor.

Before I recognize Mr. Sheehy, Congressman Payne is the Chair of the Congressional Black Caucus, and they are meeting right around noon, and he wanted to make sure if he has any statements to make before he leaves.

Mr. PAYNE. I just wanted to thank and acknowledge the former Assistant Secretary Cohen. Much of the progress we see today in the democratization of Africa and many of the structural changes to market economies all started really under Secretary Cohen, who did an outstanding job, in my opinion. As a matter of fact, it was his negotiations with the Government of Angola with the Soviet counterpart. Of course, Mr. Baker and Mr. Shevardnadze took credit for it. It was Mr. Cohen that negotiated with his counterpart the removal actually of the troops from Angola from Cuba, the negotiation of South Africa's withdrawal from Angola with their fighting forces, negotiated release of Mr. Mandela, the free elections for Libya, the elections in South Africa, the unveiling the ANC, all of that in addition to the settlement in Ethiopia, by having a transition. So I would just like to say that I really appreciated working with him and wanted to just say that for the record.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. What has he done for us lately?

Thank you, Mr. Payne. Thank you, Mr. Frazer. I know you both have to go.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Willie Lamoussé-Smith appears in the appendix.]

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Sheehy.

STATEMENT OF THOMAS SHEEHY, JAY KINGHAM FELLOW IN INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AFFAIRS, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION

Mr. SHEEHY. I would like to thank you for the opportunity to appear before the committee.

I suppose I would differ slightly with Secretary Moose's assessment of democracy making good progress in Africa over the last 5 or 6 years. One can not look at Cameroon, Gabon, Gambia or Zimbabwe for that matter, and gain a great deal of confidence for the democratic progress.

Certainly there have been exceptions to this trend, and I would point to South Africa. But a country like Zimbabwe, which recently held elections, I don't know how anyone can look at Zimbabwe, those elections, and be optimistic.

Likewise with Ghana, as Congressman Johnston had mentioned, a very vibrant press. My comments in terms of the political repression have now been taken right from the State Department's Human Rights Report. So clearly Ghana has not, to my mind, made a great progress with democracy. But I will return to Ghana.

Clearly expectations were set too high. I think with the end of the cold war we expected miracles in Africa. One of the previous speakers was correct in identifying South Africa as the one true democracy on the continent.

We don't have African countries with regular elections, secret ballots, freedom of the press and the protection of human rights. I think we can all agree most African countries use elections as a means of manipulating and pacifying foreign donors, and it really uses elections in a very manipulative way.

Secretary Moose mentioned the role of international observers. I had the chance to be on an international observation delegation, and my only comment is there can be a real downside to going in. Those types of judgments are extremely subjective and often ex-

tremely political. So it becomes a real diplomacy, and I think you have to warn against just looking at, well, 28 international delegations have said this particular election is free and fair.

Getting back to why we have not had the progress with democracy. I think everyone recognizes that the social, economic and political conditions in Africa too often don't support the democratic process. We have poor infrastructure, illiteracy and poverty. There is also the problem of tribalism. I know of no political scientist who recognizes tribalism, which is so pervasive in Africa, as being a positive thing in terms of democratic progress.

The Clinton administration has identified bringing about democracy as a prime objective in its Africa policy, an ambitious task to say the least. We do have some sticks and some carrots for promoting that policy, but they are very limited. We have seen that in Nigeria. Often we don't even want to apply the carrots and especially the sticks that we do have. So there are very definite limits to what we can do to promote democracy.

Let me give you an example which I think defines those limits. Ambassador Hempstone from Kenya, the United States was blessed with an extraordinary ambassador during the Bush administration. I would suggest he almost single-handedly and doggedly pushed the Kenyan regime into holding democratic elections.

Hempstone threw himself into the arena with a confidence only someone of 30 years of experience in Africa and a real indifference to Foggy Bottom politics could do. He brought about, largely through public condemnation, agitation, and he was successful, though the elections were tainted. Donors were willing at that point to push for democracy.

Clearly the United States today is not taking that high profile push for democracy in Kenya. Democracy in Kenya has largely stalled. There are several reasons for this. First, we needed the Kenyan Government's cooperation in Somalia to combat that intervention. There may also be some issues regarding Sudan. It is perceived that strategic interests supersede our interests in elections. There are also concerns about tribalism, and the fact that movement toward democracy is exacerbating tribal differences.

We have talked about donor coordination. Britain and France don't have the same attitudes about democracy in Kenya or any other African countries but the United States does.

But I use the example of Kenya because I think it is important to recognize those were extraordinary circumstances because we had an extraordinary individual who promoted democracy. I only use that example to cite the tremendous challenges that we have and also the fact that our highest priority is not always pushing forward with democracy, and unfortunately I think Ambassador Hempstone's success has proved rather ephemeral.

Research that we have done at the Heritage Foundation with my colleague, Bryan Johnson, was published in the Index of Economic Freedom and identifies a strong correlation between economic freedom and economic growth, and certainly that economic growth is crucial to supporting any democratic progress in Africa.

Unfortunately our research identifies Africa as one of the least free or the most least free economies in the world, though there are some notable exceptions. We looked at the 24 countries from last

year to this year. Some African countries are improving. Botswana, Madagascar, Mali and Mozambique are countries that are liberalizing their economy.

This, of course, brings some policy challenges to the United States. Should the United States go ahead and support a country that is liberalizing its economy and yet isn't liberalizing its political system? What about countries that are liberalizing their political system and not their economic system?

Of course, this is the dilemma we face as an aid donor. Secretary of State Christopher said democracy and development go hand in hand. I think in looking at many African countries, they often don't go quite hand in hand. Often particular countries will progress with economic reform at a pace quite different from political liberalization. Look at Uganda, a country we talked about as a so-called star of the donor community. I commend President Museveni. He has liberalized the economy, gotten rid of price controls, and he is continuing to open up to foreign investment. The country has somewhere around 10 percent economic growth rate, but Uganda is not a democracy. Like Ghana, the two countries that are doing the most with economic reform have brought them about in what I call a politically illiberal environment.

We can debate whether the 1992 elections in Uganda were free or not, whether the elections in Uganda—moving the elections this year are truly free, but the point is these reforms were started 10 years ago really under very authoritarian circumstances.

A countercase would be in Mali. I noted that Mali is moving rapidly with economic reform, and Freedom House recognized Mali as a democracy.

So the evidence isn't entirely clear in terms of what types of transition can be made and we should support those transitions. This issue of the authoritarian means toward economic reform is one the most contested in the social sciences. Typically people look at Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore and Chile and suggest it is easier for an authoritarian regime to bring about economic reform. There are some democratic regimes that have progressed in economic reform, such as Argentina and in the Czech Republic. So there is some debate. My general view is that authoritarian regimes have a little easier time in bringing about economic reform.

I would have to throw out a caveat or two. Most of the authoritarian regimes in Ghana and Uganda still have a long way to go. To my mind, it is not clear Ghana can maintain—will maintain its economic liberalization. In our analysis, these countries are still, unfortunately, quite far behind in the pack. So even though these two countries have been commended in their reform, everyone agrees there is more liberalization to bring about. Whether that can happen or not I think is an open question. They may be unwilling to increase their economic freedom because it will bring political freedom and undermine their authoritarianism.

Just to conclude, in terms of what policy restrictions I support, I should say right now I am not a fan of development assistance. I think if you look at Africa, it hasn't been successful. Congressman Johnson had mentioned Congressman McDermott's new bill. I suggest the committee really look at this bipartisan task force. We

need a revolutionary, dramatic new approach to Africa, not tinkering around with the status quo.

However, I am not devaluing democracy, and I don't support providing development aid to authoritarian regimes. My main point would be that development aid without free market reforms in Africa, or anywhere for that matter, is guaranteed to promote economic stagnation, which can only hurt democracy, for democracy does not grow where governments actively seek or deny their citizens economic power.

Unfortunately, for a host of reasons, our AID programs, which, everyone—Republican, Democrat, conservative, liberal—recognize a need for dramatic overhaul of our AID problems, unfortunately those programs have so many objectives, they don't focus on economic reform. They don't focus on promotion of democracy. There are too many objectives, and I think that is the real start for making a serious difference in Africa, looking at our development systems program.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sheehy appears in the appendix.]

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Sheehy, and following up on one of your last statements about how democracy does not grow in governments which actively deny their citizens economic power, as you pointed out, in most African countries, the government controls most economic power either through State marketing boards, State-owned enterprises, State regulation of the entire economy. So what sort of criteria should we apply in our foreign aid program to promote this type of economic freedom in Africa?

Mr. SHEEHY. We look at 10 factors, things like privatization, tax rates, regulatory burden, protection of private property. Africa, we all recognize, is coming from a legacy of statism. I am more interested—when I look at our economic or development assistance program or look at what foreign investors might be looking at in a country, I am interested in looking at countries making progress.

We talked about the need for additional resources. Many reforms, reforms which, to my mind, show a country's good faith effort, don't require a lot of money. Often privatization—it need not require a lot of money. Protection of private property rights, yes, you need a regulatory regime and legal system, but so often there isn't the will to support private property.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Do you look only at those economic factors, or do you look at the judiciary, the free press, human rights?

Mr. SHEEHY. One of our factors is protection of private property. Obviously crucial to that is the judiciary system, how long it guarantees protection of private property.

I commend Freedom House. I think the factors they look at are important. However, we think the economic freedom is the other side of the same coin. Unless a country is moving forward with these reforms, I don't care if it has had free elections or, quote, "free elections". It may very likely have been manipulated by the government. I want to see countries making progress with the economic reforms, because we have seen throughout the world over the last 30 years that these are the things that matter, and countries will do so at a different pace. I think it is important that we at least see some progress.

My comments really play off Congressman Hastings'. It is evolutionary. It is progress to reform. It is a different style, but there are certain fundamental things like protection of property, to my mind, we need to see.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much for following up on those kinds of statements.

In many countries, as we know, job opportunities are very limited outside the government sector. Jobs in government are limited to those also who support the government's party. Do you believe that the United States should promote the movement toward privatization as vigorously in those seeking a democracy transition, and have you seen that successfully done, and cite some examples about privatization.

Dr. LAMOUSE-SMITH. Yes, very much so. But beyond that, the United States—or in addition to that, United States can also begin to promote investments in Africa that will create jobs.

There are investments in Africa. When a company comes to Africa with huge machines and extracts gold or diamonds and so on, the number of people employed is very, very low. When we come to Africa and use the resources there to manufacture things which Africans themselves can buy and use, that helps the economy much more.

If you go to Africa today, you find that African markets are flooded with very, very cheap quality things from China, for instance. Those are things which Africans themselves should be able to produce. They need the technical know-how, they need the vocational education, they need the skills to be able to use their own resources. That is the kind of area where a number of companies can go and invest.

So, yes, privatization can create jobs through our know-how in areas of how to use local materials.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. That's true. Thank you, Doctor.

Ambassador Cohen, in your testimony you recommend that AID give more support for institution building, political parties, civic society, the judiciary, et cetera. Some, including American ambassadors in Africa, have questioned whether it is proper for them to be working with political parties. You certainly have a lot of experience in this area. What do you think is the proper role of the U.S. Government in working with political parties of other countries, and what sort of activities would you consider to be improper?

Mr. COHEN. I think there is nothing wrong with working with civic society without going directly to government. We have had a very good experience with that in the anti-apartheid struggle, when giving assistance directly to the apartheid government was prohibited by law.

So, giving assistance to civic society worked out quite well. There is no reason why we couldn't do this in other parts of Africa, and political party assistance could be quite neutral. Cadres can be trained.

How do you run a political party? How do you do fund-raising? How do you communicate with the public? There is nothing political about that. This is all very technical stuff, and I don't see why NED and all of these organizations we have couldn't do that, and I think governments might even appreciate that.

I have talked to some governments about this. They say, sure our own parties need this type of help. I don't see any real downside to that.

Now if you have a situation where some parties are considered enemies of the State, then you are getting into delicate waters, but I think in most African countries now it is not true. Political parties are not enemies.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Let me ask the three of you a general question about cooperation from our allies. What sort of cooperation can we expect between Asian or European allies involving democracy and furthering of the democratic institutions in Africa? How involved do you see them being, or do they not want to participate in that. Tom?

Mr. SHEEHY. I know Ambassador Cohen has had greater experience than me in terms of dealing with donors on a multilateral basis. My general impression, however, is that certainly the European countries take much more of a broader view in terms of democratic progress, are not quite as willing to push the optics of democracy, elections and so forth, and take a somewhat different view. I think that does strain our relationships with them over a particular country.

My impression of the Asian countries is that they are much more interested in doing commerce. If you look at South Africa, which has attracted considerable Asian investment, both private sector as well as some aid, they are not quite as interested in seeing the democratic progress.

That doesn't mean they are indifferent to it, but I think many of our allies, they are in development aid programs that are much more mercenary, particularly the Japanese, who see it as an arm of their commercial activities.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you.

Doctor?

Dr. LAMOUSÉ-SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I agree with what Sheehy has said. I think that the allies in Europe, for instance, deserve to be considered by Africans as neocolonialist in their exploitation of African raw materials and labor, feeling it is their property more than anything else.

If you look at the history of the last 35 years, it was these former colonizers who practiced democracy within their own societies, but strongly supported totalitarian regimes in Africa, which made it easier for them to continue their practices. So I am not sure they are genuine in their effort. They pay lip service. That is the way I see it. I don't think that they are—I say they could be more forthcoming.

As far as Asian countries, for the most it is business. I don't know how much exploitation one can put on them. I think that a lot of the initiative should come from here. We should not forget one thing though: Without the United States of America, African nations would not have become independent. The Atlantic Charter, that is where it all started. So I recognize a responsibility morally in the same way to free Africans, but I think Africa has responsibilities, too.

So I am encouraged. America should encourage its allies to do more than they have done, which would also, of course, make the weight lighter for America.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Doctor.
Ambassador.

Mr. COHEN. Just quickly, there is a lot of cooperation on economic reforms already. Support for economic freedom and reforms takes place in the consultative group in Paris, where the aid programs and other things are discussed, and there is fruitful cooperation.

In democracy it is less true, but I think the countries most amenable to this are the Scandinavians, the Dutch and even the British, who have more colonial background, but I think they are more interested in democracy than, say, the French or the Japanese, who are pursuing their own interests in general.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. Excellent presentation from all three of you.

Thank you for being with us today. Thanks to the audience for being with us.

[Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CONGRESSMAN AMO HOUGHTON

STATEMENT ON HOUSE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 160 TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA

I'd first like to thank Chairwoman Ros-Lehtinen and all of the members and staff of the subcommittee for bringing this bill up before today's timely hearing on democratic elections in Africa. I'd also like to thank Mr. Chabot, Mr. Ackerman, Mr. Johnston, Mr. Engel, Mr. Payne, Mr. Hastings, Mr. Frazer, Mr. Campbell and Mr. Watt for cosponsoring this resolution in the House, and Senators Jim Jeffords and Nancy Kassebaum for agreeing to sponsor an identical resolution on the Senate side. I appreciate their help.

As you may know, the tiny West African nation of Sierra Leone has endured a terrible civil war under a military regime for the past five years. This war has killed thousands and displaced almost half the country's population. On February 26, 1996, Sierra Leoneans exercised their right to vote for the first time in nearly thirty years in democratic, multiparty elections for a president and parliament. A subsequent runoff election for the presidency was held on March 15. On March 29, the nation celebrated the peaceful transition from military rule to civilian leadership when Mr. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah was sworn-in as the country's new president.

A delegation from the African-American Institute (AAI), in cooperation with the United Nations, observed the elections and issued a statement that I would like

to make a part of the record at this time. The statement stresses that although there were some logistical difficulties, mainly due to a lack of infrastructure, the vote still went forward due to the fierce determination of a vast majority of the population to hold the elections on schedule, even in the face of serious attempts to obstruct and disrupt the process. The elections were deemed free and fair by the entire group of international observers from the UN and British Commonwealth delegations. This would certainly not have been predicted just a short time ago.

I don't think anyone believes that simply holding an election assures that a country is automatically on its way to a completely open, free and prosperous democracy. Nothing could be further from the truth. Free elections are simply one of the first steps on the road to a lasting democracy. That road is very long -- it's a journey with no final destination. What a new democracy needs is encouragement, and that is the main purpose of this resolution. It doesn't suggest a major change in U.S. policy, and really won't make much of a difference to the average U.S. citizen, but I have to feel that it is very important to the people of Sierra Leone.

Another matter stressed in the resolution is that if Sierra Leone does develop into a successful democracy, the ripple effect on their notorious authoritarian neighbors -- Nigeria, Liberia and Niger, to name a few -- could be significant. As South African writer Allister Sparks suggested in a recent Washington Post column, rather than being seen as the rotten core of West Africa, Sierra Leone

could be a pinpoint of light on an otherwise gloomy landscape.

As we sit here today, negotiations continue between the government and the leader of the rebel movement to put a decisive end to the civil war that has ravaged the country for the past five years. Our resolution also encourages all of the people of Sierra Leone to work together as they negotiate an end to these conflicts.

Finally, our resolution reaffirms the commitment of the United States to help nations move toward freedom and democracy, especially on the African continent. I think we all agree that this is a goal of the United States that is worthy of our support.

Before I close, I would especially like to thank President Kabbah and the people of Sierra Leone for their cooperation as our military evacuated Americans from the neighboring country of Liberia. Their help was critical and is much appreciated.

Also deserving special recognition are our many citizens who serve our country in Sierra Leone, led by John Hirsch, who has been doing a tremendous job as U.S. Ambassador in Freetown.

Madam Chair, it seems that we hear so much about the tragedies and misfortunes that happen in Africa. It's nice to be able to emphasize the good things when they occur. I hope that all of the members of the subcommittee will join me in voting for this important and timely resolution. Thank you.

Statement of George E. Moose
Assistant Secretary for Africa
before the
Committee on International Relations
Subcommittee on Africa
U.S. House of Representatives

April 17, 1996

Good morning. I appreciate this opportunity to discuss democracy and elections in Africa. Six years have now passed since Namibia led the vanguard of nineteen African nations onto a new path of democracy. The United States can be proud of its contribution to democratic reform, but we should be mindful that it is Africans themselves who have chosen democracy. Today, I would like to talk about why we believe they have done so, what results their efforts have produced, and why it is in the self-interest of the United States to continue its support.

The people of Africa began to abandon old political ideologies and experiments in centralized economic systems well before the end of the cold war. They saw democracy and free market economies as hopeful alternatives to the failed policies that had left them less well off than their parents. They looked to transparent and accountable government as a cure to corruption. They saw the possibility of participation as a way to end conflict. They hoped that democracy would allow them greater control over the political and economic systems that governed their lives. Africans have sought democracy for the same reasons Americans promote it -- because it provides the greatest hope for prosperity, peace and a better tomorrow.

What has Africa's experiment with democracy produced? The results are frankly mixed. Each country has had to find its own way, one compatible with its unique history, culture and challenges. When we look at the Sub-Saharan continent today, we see strong democratic successes, like Namibia, Benin, South Africa and Mali. We see countries which began well and stumbled, like Niger, and we see countries that have taken steps backward -- The Gambia, Sudan, and Nigeria, to name three. Africa's progress has been neither linear nor monolithic, but there has been progress: In 1989 there were only five African countries that could be described as democracies; today there are twenty-three.

Most countries have introduced democracy through elections. A common myth associated with elections in Africa is that most have been flawed. The reality is that, counting last month's elections in Sierra Leone, twenty-two -- or two-thirds -- of Africa's "first time" elections have been judged free and fair by outside observers. Thirteen incumbents were unseated through those elections. Already, Namibia, Cape Verde, Comoros and Benin have conducted their second round of free and fair national elections. These achievements receive little public notice, but they are critical to laying the foundation for greater political change.

Even in countries where we have witnessed flawed elections, we see political openings allowing for continued pressure for change. Newly elected parliaments in Togo and Kenya, for example, have demanded greater accountability from the executive branch in its handling of public resources.

In helping Africans hold free and fair elections, the United States combines diplomatic pressure, often with donor partners, and direct assistance. Our aim is to promote transparency, participation and a level playing field. Our programs emphasize technical assistance over expensive commodities and include such things as help in formulating electoral laws and procedures, training for political parties and poll watchers, education for voters and civic associations, and providing international election observers.

There are those who believe elections are insignificant unless they result in instant democracy. Democracy does not emerge instantly, as we in the United States know well; and elections represent only one important element in a democracy. Strong institutions, like impartial judiciaries and independent legislatures, a free press, vibrant civil associations, and a culture of respect for human rights and citizen participation, are just as important to a strong democracy as elections. These take time to develop. Power-sharing and equal political and civil rights did not come easily to us, and we should not expect them to come easily to Africa. We can expect resistance, and we find it.

Yet despite decades of authoritarian rule, severe economic problems, and, in some cases, great resistance to change, Africans are developing and strengthening their democratic institutions. In Benin, for example, the Constitutional court declared the former ruler winner of the recent presidential elections, and the incumbent, President Soglo, stepped down. In the Central African Republic, a nascent parliamentary opposition group forced the resignation of a prime minister on a motion of censure for mismanagement. In Kenya, the legislature turned back a bill proposed by the executive that would have restricted freedom of the press. And in eleven countries, as diverse as Ghana, Sierra Leone and South Africa, independent election commissions have become part of the political landscape. The United States has been instrumental in its support of all of these institutions.

Perhaps the most dramatic change in Africa has taken place in its civil society. In the early 1990s, new and vibrant civic groups and independent newspapers sprung up across the continent. We are now seeing the effects of private radio and television stations, and we are witnessing an increase in the participation of women in public life. I am proud that the United States has also been at the forefront of support for African civil society and African women.

Africans have taken the lead in bringing democracy to their countries and the United States has supported them. That is because it is in our national interest to do so. Democratic values are fundamental to our system of political beliefs, and promoting policies that support democracy reinforces virtually all of our other policy objectives.

Encouraging free market economic reforms and developing markets for U.S. trade and investment are also important policy priorities. With ten percent of the world's population and one quarter of its land mass, Africa's potential is important to us. Promoting democratic governance, accountability, and the rule of law fosters the kind of enabling environment the U.S. private sector requires to do business.

Each year, millions of taxpayers' dollars go for costly humanitarian relief and peacekeeping operations in Africa. We are active in efforts to reduce these costs through conflict resolution and prevention activities. Strong, democratic institutions offer the means to resolve social and economic problems peacefully; supporting them is far more cost-effective than paying the bill for the results of war.

The United States has already made an impact on economic development. Population growth has slowed where the United States has supported family planning. Rising literacy rates, the emergence of new entrepreneurs in the private sector, and higher export earnings are partially the result of development programs we support bilaterally and through international institutions. The democracy programs we assist, particularly those that develop civil society, complement and enrich these development activities because they focus on civic participation and citizen responsibility.

We who have worked to promote democracy in Africa have learned many lessons. Promoting democracy is not just one discrete activity; it is accomplished in a variety of ways and is linked to other objectives. It is a long-term proposition, and we are likely to witness both success and setbacks along the way. Democracy is more than just an election: It is a culture that cannot be imposed but must be developed from within. For that reason, we must be patient. We must take advantage of opportunities that arise and be ready to work with different groups -- governments, legislatures, parliaments, civic associations, judiciary, press and the private sector.

Democracy in many countries is fragile and can be easily undermined by overinflated expectations, fear of the cost of losing power, and corporate military interests. We need to look at the underlying causes of the coups or coup attempts in Gambia, Niger, Guinea and Burundi. We need to understand what needs to take place, along with elections and political and economic reform, to ensure that gains are not lost through conflict, fear, or repression.

We, and the citizens of the new democracies, must take a farsighted view about democracy, even as we help address immediate expectations through innovative and cost-effective strategies. We must continue to work in concert with other governments and institutions to influence reluctant leaders to open their governments to popular participation and scrutiny. We must encourage civil society's watchdog role and remain vigilant to human rights. And we must do a better job at engaging the African private sector to assume their responsibility. We must stay engaged when the going gets tough, as it surely has in Liberia, Rwanda, and Burundi; see our efforts through in Angola and Mozambique; and maintain the pressure on Nigeria and Zaire to make good on commitments to elections.

Ultimately, the success of democracy in Africa depends on Africans themselves. But at this moment in history, the United States has a unique opportunity to help Africa's people form the institutions and leaders they need to create the change they -- and we -- are seeking on the continent. In the past two years we have seen countries like South Africa, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Benin, Mali, Angola and Senegal adopt a "good neighbor policy" to counter coups and help restore democracy in African countries. We, too, need to be a "good neighbor" to Africans seeking democracy. Failure to commit is in no one's interest. Democracy in Africa is in all of our interests.

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HERMAN J. COHEN

Senior Advisor, Global Coalition for Africa

Statement Before The
House Committee on International Relations
Subcommittee on Africa
April 17, 1996

Democratic Elections: Myth or Reality in Africa

Madame Chairman:

Thank you for inviting me to make a statement before the Subcommittee on the very important subject of democratization in Africa. Before I give my statement, I wish to inform you that my consulting firm, Cohen and Woods International, currently acts as an official advisor to the Governments of Angola and Côte d'Ivoire for which we have registered under the Foreign Agents Registration Act. In the past, we have also done work for the governments of Benin, Togo and Gabon.

As you know, the Global Coalition for Africa was established in 1990 to encourage a frank dialogue between senior African leaders and their development partners on ways to remove obstacles to economic growth. During the past five years the GCA dialogue has increasingly found that as many obstacles to development lie in the sectors of politics and governance as in economic management. As a contribution to the analysis of this problem, the GCA sponsored a study of political transition in nine African countries. Completed in late 1995, the country studies were done by scholars and researchers who are nationals of the countries concerned. The GCA Secretariat, which is located here in Washington, prepared a synthesis of the policy issues and implications of the nine studies, the conclusions of which I will summarize briefly for you in a moment.

First, I would like to give you my personal perspective on the state of democratization in Africa. On the basis of five years of experience with "free and fair" elections and all that goes with this process in Africa, I feel that the African democratization cup is half full rather than half empty. Despite the glaring abuses that have taken place in too many African countries in the form of election rigging, election tampering, registration fraud, and physical intimidation, I look back over a five year period and see very significant political changes in Africa.

In the vast majority of African countries, there has been a general opening up of political life which has been liberalized beyond recognition. The biggest changes have taken place in the areas of freedom of speech and freedom of the press.

In most countries, criticism of the government and its political leaders is no longer a one-way ticket to prison. During my last visit to Gabon, for example, I witnessed a public demonstration by angry women who were protesting a government legislative proposal that would have made it legal for a man to enter into a polygamous marriage without his wife's permission, which is currently required by law.

In a significant number of countries as well, elections have been truly free and fair, and the handover of power from a regime in office to an opposing group, has been relatively smooth, as in Zambia, Malawi, and Benin. There is also an increasing degree of government accountability in the form of budgets that are relatively transparent and subject to line-by-line debate in

parliament and in the press. In most countries, political prisoners are a phenomenon of the past, as is the repressive and omnipresent "secret police."

Of course, there are still too many countries in which power is monopolized by a small group of elites who tend to belong to a single ethnic group that is unwilling to risk its control of resources and wealth at the ballot box. These are the people who engage in corrupt manipulation of the democratic process, since it is no longer fashionable to be openly repressive, as was the case in the past. These are the countries which are in a state of "blocked transition", where some degree of liberalization has taken place, and where opposition to the existing regime is able to express itself, but where the power structure remains closed to the possibility of real change. Examples of this phenomenon currently are Cameroon and Swaziland. But even these countries are far more open at least to free debate than in the past. Two years ago, I gave a televised press interview in Cameroon's commercial capital of Douala where the anti-government nature of the questioning was extremely vitriolic. The journalists were not incarcerated as a result.

In general, therefore, my feeling is that Africa has a long way to go before most countries can claim to be truly democratic, but the progress that has been achieved in just five years is mostly positive and worthy of continued support by the United States and other donor governments.

The nine-country GCA study that I mentioned at the beginning was carried out in Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. All of the studies pointed to the fact that transition to democracy from the one-party state cannot be instantaneous. It has never been instantaneous in any other part of the world either, but Africa has its own set of problems.

Certainly, most African countries enjoy a culture of democracy at the village level which has existed for centuries. However, it has always been difficult for Africans to translate the culture of village democracy to one of national democracy which must transcend ethnic and geographic boundaries. During the past fifty years, the colonial experience and the marxist one-party state experience entrenched the idea of all-powerful authoritarian central governments. Particularly damaging during the marxist one-party experience was the substantial suppression of free and independent civil society in the name of "revolutionary" party solidarity. African leaders who are now embarked on a sincere effort to bring about a real transition to democracy are therefore handicapped by recent history which has pushed much of Africa in the wrong direction.

The GCA study provides some ideas of what works and what does not work in assuring a positive political transition.

1. Participation: People will believe that change is taking place if they have a sense of participation so that no ethnic, religious, or regional group feel they have been excluded. For this reason, certain experiments currently underway with respect to the decentralization of government power and functions, particularly in Mali and Ethiopia merit study and possible support. It is also my firm belief that South Africa will be more democratic and efficient if it accepts a federal system in its new constitution that gives significant authority to the provinces.

2. Ethnicity Must Be Addressed and Not Suppressed. The fact that people seek a sense of identity through ethnicity or religion is not unique to Africa. New York State politics was subject to that phenomenon when I was growing up there. In Africa, the problem is exacerbated by the relative isolation of communities at the village level where most people live. Political transition works better if ethnic interests are considered in the distribution of power and access to resources. The opposite was true, of course, in

Rwanda, Burundi, Liberia and Somalia, as well as in some of the states currently in a situation of "blocked transition."

3. Effective institutions are needed to make democracy work. A vibrant civil society containing a wide range of institutions is needed as a countervailing force to government.

4. Viable Government institutions are needed to underpin democracy. Democratic constitutions in Africa have produced independent judiciaries and parliaments, but these do not always have the resources, trained individuals and traditions to do their jobs effectively. I commend USAID for paying attention to this problem in Africa. For example, USAID supports a Ghanaian NGO called the "Institute of Economic Affairs" which has a project that helps educate members of Parliament about pending legislation. Because the idea of an independent parliament is relatively new, many of the newly elected legislators literally do not know what they are being called to vote on. The IEA conducts workshops that brings legislators together with experts in the subject of the legislation. The result has been healthy debate with constructive changes in legislation introduced by informed members.

5. Political Parties Are Immature. This is often true for both the parties that have been in power for a long time, and those that are in opposition. The parties with longevity have a hard time changing from a monopolistic position to one where they must compete. The KANU party in Kenya is a good example of a political organization that can't stand the presence of non-Kanu members in the same parliamentary chamber. In many cases also, opposition parties are no better. Their only platform consists of a desire to replace the "rascals" in power. As they say in the francophone countries, "a project for society" is absent. That is why I hope that funding will continue for the National Endowment for Democracy so that the National Democratic Institute and the International Republican Institute will be able to continue their work with political parties.

6. The Military Are a Vital Element in Transition. Military establishments have too often been misused by one-party regimes to sustain repression and conformity. In a number of cases, these regimes have been controlled by the military as in Zaire, Mali before 1992, Ghana, Niger, Lesotho and Nigeria among others. Just as there is a big difference between war-making and peace-making, there is also a big difference between military support for a democratic constitution and military participation in an authoritarian dictatorship. Training and acculturation are essential. As we have seen in Nigeria, the Gambia and Niger in recent years, the military coup is still not totally forgotten in Africa. With respect to the democratization of civil-military relations, I believe the United States military can play a significant role with a relatively small amount of resources.

7. Good Governance Need Not Await Democracy: The more Africans examine their own development situations, the more they conclude that the reform which underpins all other reforms is good governance. The private investments that are needed to bring about economic growth will not be made unless governments can assure the rule of law, the sanctity of contracts, the transparency of transactions, the protection of private property, and the perceived fairness of government policy in an overall enabling environment for private sector activity. All of these governance reforms can be put into place rather quickly, and need not await full-fledged democracy. Indeed such reforms are themselves among the crucial building blocks of democracy. That is why I believe the experiences of Ghana, Uganda, and Côte d'Ivoire right now are worth studying and supporting in the sense that real governance reforms are preceding, and are thereby pulling, real democratic reforms.

I know that Congressional committees like to consider any possible legislative implications surrounding issues that they study in hearings such as this one. I have a few recommendations for the Subcommittee.

A. More support for institution building: USAID's support for democratization in Africa is very good, and should continue to the extent that funds are available. I recommend that in the Subcommittee's oversight of the program, USAID be encouraged to move more toward institution building (i.e. political parties, civic society, judiciary etc) and somewhat away from election support. It is what happens after the elections that really counts.

B. Give Priority to Decentralization: In an era of declining resources, the United States Government has to choose its priorities carefully. I would recommend that African countries making a sincere effort to devolve power and resources to lower levels of government be given priority. This is not only a boost for democracy, but totally in conformity with our own tradition.

C. Revive Modest Military Assistance: When military assistance to African countries was relatively abundant, it was used mainly in support of U.S. strategic interests, as it should have been. A small part of that assistance in the category of "civic action" was a positive precursor of what the U.S. military can do in the area of African military transition to democracy. I believe that with very modest resources, the United States military could make a substantial contribution to the democratization of African military establishments. This Subcommittee made a major contribution to African political transition through its successful sponsorship of P L. 103-381, the African Conflict Resolution Act of 1994. I would suggest a follow-on piece of legislation that you might want to name "the African Military Democratization Act". The emphasis would be on military to military relationships of the type that contributed to democratic change in the militaries of Latin America. I am sure that those of us who served as informal advisors in the drafting of PL 103-381 would be happy to regroup for the follow-on legislation if the Subcommittee is so inclined.

The foregoing is my perspective on the process of democratization in Africa today. I believe that forward movement is palpable and generally dominant, despite the backward movement that we see too often in places like the Gambia, Nigeria, and Equatorial Guinea. For those of you who care about Africa, and feel deeply disappointed whenever there is a momentary setback to democracy, hang a sign up in your mental office that says, "It's the transition, stupid." I hope that will restore perspective and equilibrium.

Thank you again for inviting me.

DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS: MYTH OR REALITY IN AFRICA?

Presented by

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April 17th, 1996.

U.S. House of Representatives
House Committee on International Relations
Subcommittee on Africa.

Democratic Elections:
Myth or Reality in Africa?

W.B. Lamoussé-Smith

Introduction. The seeming suddenness with which multiparty elections have been democratically held recently in many Africa countries has been both a cause for celebration and for concern. Are the changes a temporary aberration that must be accorded only a fleeting attention? Or do the changes presage real structural re-ordering of relations? Historical processes that have significantly determined and affected political developments in contemporary Africa are identified and analyzed to reach the conclusion that the decade of the 1990s may be called **Africa's decade of protodemocracy**. As the implied answer to the question is in the affirmative, the democratic electoral processes that have begun, deserve to be strengthened. What kinds of strategic actions are called for in the mutual interests of the United States and Africa to maintain direction and sustain processes that are opening paths to democracy in Africa? The issue of how much of the changes are a myth and how much is real, has been examined. The conclusions point out that the phase of Africa's protodemocracy is a foundation period for concrete actions. It is a phase for which a number of proposed steps can be taken and bold policies be formulated for realistic and achievable results. Most of the nations on the continent of Africa are poised to move the continent forward into democratic way of life and sustainable development.

Background: Pre-transition to democracy. The "winds of change" that began after the second World War to dismantle formal European colonization in Sub-Saharan Africa also raised optimistic expectations for the development of democratic governments in the post-colonial era. Colonial rule had been hegemonic and authoritarian. However, when the end to the rule became imminent,

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one colonial government after the other began to "prepare" their subjects for independence. The preparation usually entailed introducing aspects of institutions of liberal democracy such as a national constitution, multiparty plebiscites and elections, and a Western European parliamentary model. Notwithstanding this parting gift, the real form of political legacy that the colonial administrations bequeathed to Africans was the model of authoritarian rule experienced by Africans under their domination.

The 1960s were Africa's Decade of Independence. From Ghana's independence in 1957 to the independence of Mauritius and Equatorial Guinea in 1968, 33 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa out of 49 were decolonized and admitted into full membership of the United Nations. The transfer of governmental reins to the newly independent states was generally peaceful for the majority of colonies. Colonies with sizable numbers of European settlers found themselves in lengthy periods of armed liberation struggle. Algeria, Angola, Guinea Bissau & Cape Verde, Kenya, Mozambique, Namibia and South Africa were decolonized by wars of liberation.

The tasks that challenged all the newly independent governments were enormous. They ranged from providing basic social services such as primary schools and health clinics to developing and growing their economies. Power had to be consolidated in order to hold together the integrity of their national borders that had tenuously been held together by authoritarian colonial rule. All the new independent states took umbrage under the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity which prohibited the re-drawing of the borders inherited from colonialism. The Charter also forbade interference in the domestic affairs of member states.

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These clauses in the Charter virtually assured that a member state could administer its internal affairs without fear of criticism. They served as an insulation from intra-African opprobrium.

Neither forewarned nor pre-trained for finding solutions to the complex problems of their new nations, one African government after the other began to dismantle their independence constitutions, and along with them the parliamentary systems of power sharing. One-party states sprouted throughout the continent and, before long, blurred the lines of distinction among state, government and party. Protections for personal liberties under the independent democratic constitutions began to disappear. Opposition political parties were co-opted or disbanded. The political party in power came to be equated with the government and the state. The legacy of colonial authoritarianism was mixed with new models of governmental operation from Marxist socialist nations. The resulting dictatorships and police-states eroded the nascent foundations for democratic rule. Some of these one-party states rationalized their behavior as necessary for national unity against real or potential ethnic, religious or political partisan divisions and conflicts. Others purported that the monopolistic concentration of power in a single leader was a prerequisite for economic development.

Abuses of power, economic maladministration and corruption of leaders in one-party states provided ambitious soldiers and police

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excuses to overthrow civilian governments. Only a handful of African heads of state were able to stay in office to term and beyond, and then hand over peacefully to a successor. The intervention of the African military in politics has further delayed the emergence and development of liberal democracy. The records of Africa's soldiers-turned-politicians in charge of national governments have been no better than those of civilian administrations. The soldiers were overwhelmed by vagaries of political instability, demands for re-shaping the economies for development, complexities of international relations, and widespread inimical relations among ethnic groups. Oligarchic absolutism at the top characterized these governments, which ironically were also weak.

Their feeling of self-insecurity led to huge investments in security organizations whose major role was to clamp down on their own citizens. In countries such as Ghana, Togo, Benin and Nigeria the military have ruled longer than civilian politicians during the post-colonial era. The culmination of military misrule in Africa were exemplified by the tyrannical despotism of Idi Amin in Uganda; the rapacious regime of Fransisco Macias Nguema in Equatorial Guinea; the avaricious and murderous government of Jean Bedel-Bokassa in Central Africa Republic; and the reign of terror of Jerry J. Rawlings in Ghana.

Thousands of citizens from these countries have ran away into exile for safety, and many more have disappeared, often with the complicity of their governments. The record of human rights protection under these and many other African governments is tragic. However, in spite of all these brutalities against their

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own citizens, the citizens did not give up on the need for the rule of law. Judging from the many who vanished into detention prisons, or were murdered by government security personnel, or just disappeared during the extended periods of repression in the vast majority of African countries, it is appropriate that this period be called the Africa's era of failed democracy.

Africa's first dance with democracy failed, not entirely as a result of African rulers by themselves, but also as a result of the different forms and types of assistance that Africa's dictators received from external sources. Governments of Africa's former colonial powers practiced democracy at home but sustained the misgovernment of Africa by Africans. In the interests of their own respective countries, China, the Soviet Union and its surrogates, the United States of America, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan and Canada sustained the growth of undemocratic governments in Africa and contributed to the unenviable reputation of Africa as "a misgoverned continent." Through outright grants and loans disguised as aid, they sustained kleptocratic and despotic African rulers. The East-West super power rivalry for strategic alliances in Africa occurred at the cost of the freedoms of African nationals. The majority of African governments misgoverned their people and, with impunity, mismanaged aid resources and pushed their national economies to the brink of bankruptcies. A common mistake has been to equate the actions and behavior of Africa's self-appointed governments with the will and desires of the people. Nothing could be further from the reality. The will of the people did not agree with the whimsical objectives of their governments.

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Transition to Protodemocracy: Receding autocracies. The short description of contemporary Africa's pre-transition to democracy places in focus the question of whether current democratic elections in Africa are a myth or reality. The introductory background above is a pointer to the question of why the present need for democratic elections. It also leads to the formulation of the problem in terms of the factors and conditions necessary for transforming autocratic dictatorships to liberal democracies.

The dismal failures of Africa's authoritarian regimes in halting or reversing the economic declines of their nations, and their inability to create political stability for their own peoples, contributed very much to the "assault" on them. The "assault" for change came from within and from without. From within the African nations, the media, trade unions, students, petty traders, export-import merchants, silenced opposition members, religious leaders, monitors of human rights, artists of popular culture, creative writers, professional associations, and many other activists and groups, which had gone underground, rose up. They had been emboldened by the impact of several events that were taking place elsewhere on the continent and outside. In the second half of the 1980s latent movements began to surface for manifest actions that led to the current Protodemocracy in Africa.

Within the continent itself, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, under the leadership of its Executive Secretary, Professor Adebayo Adedeji, provided far reaching studies and analyses of the consequences of Africa's authoritarian regimes on the continent's political and economic blight. The effective persuasions of the Secretary General of the Organisation of African

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Unity, Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim, enabled member states to be more receptive to the calls for pluralism in national elections. The African Leadership Forum, founded by General (rtd.) Olesegun Obasanjo spread the message of the time ripened for recovering and reinstating democratic rule across the continent. It is an irony that the peacemaker, who inspired courage for democracy in Africa, has become a victim of his work on the side of the rule of law, and is still languishing under house arrest in Nigeria.

From outside Africa came lessons and hope from the reformers in Eastern Europe whose dogged persistence brought down the hegemony of the Soviet Union. Soviet Marxism had been a reference model for authoritarian African governments. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund made good governance a conditionality of the Structural Adjustment Programs. The United Nations launched African development programs that included the push for good governance. From this country the Global Coalition for Africa coordinate international donor effort aimed at good governance and conflict resolution in Africa, and facilitated interactions among Non-Governmental Organizations in Africa. The African American Institute broadened the dialogue on democratization and peace. The Carter Center at Emory University informed Africans on the comparative democratic statuses of their countries. Meanwhile, the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) was founded to transmit knowledge and share technical skills in how to conduct fair elections. Above all, the US Agency for International Development stood out, committed to providing all manner of technical assistance to enable Africans recover and reinstitutionalize the long process of democratization.

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Resulting from the combined efforts of all these different constituencies, whose single goal had been the re-democratization of Sub-Saharan Africa, was the "assault" on nearly thirty years of widespread autocratic regimes. Beginning 1990 the turnover in African regimes and the speed with which they occurred were dramatic and surprising. In a matter of six years, from 1990 to 1996, multi-party elections were successfully organized in thirty four African nations. In a way, the rapidity of the changes reflected the essential fragility of the dictatorships and led to bombasts that seem to have created several myths. Among the myths were "second independence", "second liberation", "springtime of Africa", "democratic transition", "from military dictatorship to civilian, multiparty democracy", "democracy revolution." While at some future date these labels might pass for objective historical assessments, at present they do not appear to have been critically placed on the process that they are supposed to describe. Other observers captured the changes in more temperate expressions such as "democratic renewal" and "democratic reawakening."

Perhaps, it is important to point out that however democratic methods are successfully used in the conduct of Africa's multiparty elections, the results of the elections by themselves are neither equal to nor automatically create democracy. Persistence of these myths generally lead to unintended consequences. Some cynical African leaders of the authoritarian type may be led into equating democracy with the mechanisms of a multiparty election. Having met the expectations of external donors by cooperating in elections, they may not make the effort to sow the seeds of real democracy - the values and culture of democracy. Post-election frustrations and disappointments

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experienced by members of opposition (election losers) may diminish faith in their expectations of democracy. This situation is likely to be real especially for losers who might not have accepted in their hearts that the elections were "Free and Fair." It may also be noted that the elections from which the myths were created, covered presidential and parliamentary elections only, excluding outcomes of local elections.

Notwithstanding these myths, the realities of the outcomes of the democratically conducted multiparty elections, far outweigh the myths. The outcomes have good chances of being institutionalized. With funding from donor countries, especially the USA, to provide technical assistance, most African countries have established electoral commissions. Some countries such as Malawi and South Africa have ensured the protection and independence of their electoral commissions by constitutional amendments. The invitation of independent international observers to monitor the voting process along with domestic observers has virtually become an expected behavior. The integrity of the variety of technical assistance and competent communications technicians provided by an organization such as IFES has begun to restore confidence in Africa in the electoral process itself. The presence and involvement of international organizations - multilateral, non-governmental, foreign governmental representatives - in an electoral process give credence to electoral mechanism itself.

Surely, there have been difficulties in cases where opposition parties have opted to boycott an election for various causes of dissatisfaction with an incumbent government. The government is left to continue being virtually accountable to itself, as is the

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case in Ghana, although an active opposition exists outside of parliament. Similarly, the independence of a democratically conducted election diminishes in the eyes of the electorate when high level government officials simultaneously hold senior positions in the government's party. These are perceived to work for the entrenchment of the government in power. Such were the cases in Kenya, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana and Uganda.

When a government's commitment to openness is flawed by not publicizing procedures and guidelines for the electoral processes, as it happened in Cote d'Ivoire, it creates skepticism around the declaration of election results as "free and fair." The occurrences of some shortcomings are inevitable at this stage of the development of Africa's new electoral processes. This is why it is vitally important that the efficient and highly effective work of USAID and IFES in the rebuilding of Africa's democratic electoral processes is strongly supported by the House of Representatives.

There is no doubt that the transmission of technical skills in how to conduct democratic elections in Africa has opened up fundamental steps towards representative democracy. I subsume this incipient level of implanting the democratic way of life in Africa during the 1990s as Africa's decade of Protodemocracy. It is a period which will increasingly be characterized by receding personalized authoritarian rules, oligopolies and autocracies and by the slow internalization of democratic principles, spirit and culture.

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Critical Perspectives on electoral process and systems. Taking into consideration some of the obvious sources of tensions among Africans, such as inter-ethnic distrust, and distrust of government, competitive multiparty elections assume additional burdens. The involvement of a nation's diverse publics in designing and implementing electoral systems that they find acceptable, and can identify with, is an essential condition. As diverse publics in any African country participate in the creation of their nations's electoral mechanisms, their cooperation for the process is an opportunity for strengthening trust and national unity. It is crucial to create confidence in the process by eliminating as realistically as possible those conditions that are likely to cause electoral fraud.

Considering Africa's social problems such as rapid population growth, illiteracy, poverty, temporary shanty town accommodation and and migrations, the registration of voters and the demarcation of electoral wards and districts require long-term engagement to the collection of relatively reliable census data. The financial costs of such services may be burdensome and could interfere with accuracy.

Techniques of mass education offer a means for electoral education on a large scale through time. The high rates of illiteracy make education by radio a most effective way of reaching the electorate in any country. The monopolization of media in almost all African countries by the governments hampers electoral processes in many obvious ways, not the least of which is targeted disinformation. The services of an independent "Radio Free Africa", broadcasting accurate and disinterested information will

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discourage disinformation from all sides and promote peaceful competitive democratic elections.

The democratization of Africa's electoral processes, as implemented and managed by organizations working with the USAID, has had more successes than failures. The organizations have acquired experiences from different nations on the continent. They recognize variabilities in local conditions and the need to refine methodologies to meet local requirements. However, the application of the standard, "free and fair", to election results remains problematic. The empirical referents for the evaluation are seldom explained or understood by the electorate. For those who lose an election the "free and fair" declaration leaves a cloud hanging over the results for a long period after the elections.

Outlook for the future: Transition to democracy. Intellectual fascination with definitions of democracy and theoretical explorations of transitions to democracy abound from classical Greek thinkers to contemporary scholarship. While here is not the place to undertake conceptual analyses for their own sake, there are at least two questions that need to be raised. Will democracy be viable in Africa? What kind of democracy for Africa?

The history of the past thirty five years of African post-colonial independence can assure us that the growth and maturing of democracy in Africa will take time. There are many countervailing forces to slow down the progress toward mature democracies any time soon. But in spite of the problems, developments toward democracy



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Madam Chairman, distinguished members of the panel, thank you for the opportunity to appear before the subcommittee. It is a pleasure to discuss with you democracy in Africa. In my position at The Heritage Foundation, I have had the chance to observe African political and economic developments over the last several years. I hope that you will find my testimony to be of some value.

With the Cold War's end, a wave of political liberalization swept over Africa. In a short time, several long-standing authoritarian regimes gave way via elections that were demanded by church activists, students, intellectuals, labor unions and ordinary citizens. Other authoritarian regimes were forced to make concessions --effectively liberalizing their political systems-- while managing to maintain power. While most Africa observers noted the tremendous challenges facing this democratic eruption, it was a time of considerable hope.

In contrast, a survey of democracy in Africa today is discouraging. Democratic progress is being stifled in country after country, where authoritarian governments are unwilling to allow their rule to be challenged. One cannot look at Cameroon, Gabon, Gambia, Kenya, Niger, Zaire or Zimbabwe, to name a few of the relatively peaceful African nations, five years ago and today and draw much encouragement. Zambia, for instance, which was thought of as a democratic pacesetter with its 1992 election which deposed long-serving autocrat Kenneth Kaunda, has seen its government of President Chiluba fall prey to corruption and tribalism. In turn, Chiluba reportedly has expressed doubts about Zambia's readiness for democracy. Democracy has not been strengthened of late in Zambia.

There have been exceptions to this trend, the most notable being South Africa. South Africa faces considerable hurdles to its consolidation of democracy. Nevertheless, the progress it has made in a short time is encouraging. Continent-wide though, it is clear that the weakening of authoritarianism that occurred in the late 1980s and early 1990s made only possible what has proven to be problematic, that is, maintaining democratic progress in Africa.

Looking back, it is clear that expectations were set too high. Miracles were expected, or the democracy to which the developed world is accustomed, featuring regular elections, secret ballots, popular participation, issue-oriented politics, an independent judiciary, freedom of the press and the protection of human rights. But to use the cliché, democracy is more than the many African elections we have celebrated. That several African heads of state have been able to maintain power "undemocratically" in these expansive terms -- often permitting the bare minimum of political liberalization required to appease aid donors-- reveals their undemocratic motives. It also reveals that the conditions which foster these democratic institutions and norms are lacking in Africa. In other words,

African leaders who manipulate the democratic process get away with it because African economic, political and social conditions do not support democracy as practiced in the developed world.

These unresponsive conditions are well known. They are Africa's ills, including poor infrastructure, illiteracy and poverty. Indeed, South Africa's democratic successes are due in part to its relatively developed infrastructure, high literacy rates, and income levels.

However South Africa, like virtually every African country, suffers from tribalism. Throughout Africa, votes are cast overwhelmingly along tribal and ethnic lines. I know of no political scientist who views this phenomenon as supportive of democratic development. Even the strongest African democracies suffer from the tribal malady, as well as low levels of economic development.

Please tolerate a personal recollection which did much to bring home this context to me. In 1992 I served on an election observation delegation in Kenya. My team was visiting a polling station on the outskirts of Nairobi. There a gentleman was casting his ballot, though not in the privacy of a booth. Rather no fewer than 15 people were looking over his shoulder. I was mystified. The explanation was that this particular voter was classified as an illiterate, and thus was entitled to aid in casting his ballot. However, with no election official considered trustworthy, representatives from the some 15 political parties contesting the election were entitled to observe his voting to ensure that there would be no manipulation. So much for ballot secrecy, or for that matter, the prevention of manipulation. Soon after, I witnessed this same voter receiving a payment from one of the political parties in full public view. I recount this episode only to illustrate how much we take for granted concerning the workings of our democracy, and how African conditions are dramatically different.

Mozambique is another country in which democracy faces an uphill battle. Thankfully, Mozambique is at peace, for which its United Nations peacekeeping operation deserves credit. Yet while national elections were held —deemed free and fair by outsiders— there is little democracy in Mozambique. What exists is a precarious power sharing arrangement between long time adversaries Frelimo and Renamo. The end of the Cold War helped to make this reconciliation possible; it did nothing to remedy the unresponsive economic, political and social conditions. Democracy by western standards will take decades to develop in Mozambique. So while democracy in Mozambique and elsewhere in Africa is no longer a myth, it is far from a reality.

Like its predecessor, the Clinton Administration has made bringing about democracy a prime objective of its Africa policy. This task is especially ambitious given the limited tools in the U.S. democracy-building arsenal. Some sticks and carrots do exist, but they are only moderately potent. And sometimes the sticks (especially aid cutoffs and sanctions) are shelved due to overriding political and commercial considerations, as in the

current case of Nigeria. There are definite limits to America's ability to advance its commendable policy goal of promoting African democracy.

Recent U.S. policy toward Kenya illustrates these limits. During the Bush Administration, the U.S. was blessed with an extraordinary ambassador in Kenya, Smith Hempstone. During his tenure, Hempstone, sensing the vulnerability of the Kenyan government, doggedly and almost single-handedly pressured it into holding multi-party elections. Hempstone's most visible, and perhaps most effective, weapon was public diplomacy, or more specifically, public condemnation of the Moi regime. In his effort, Hempstone threw himself into the Kenyan public arena with a gusto and confidence which betrayed his 30-plus years of experience in Africa and indifference to Foggy Bottom politics. Hempstone also enjoyed the leverage of aid. Kenya is extremely aid dependent, and the donors agreed to pressure President Moi to hold multi-party elections, which he eventually did, though they were tainted.

Today the U.S. is not nearly as aggressive in promoting democracy in Kenya. The Clinton Administration undoubtedly would argue that it is equally active though in a less high-profile way, but I doubt it. One reason the steam was taken out of the American democracy push was the perceived need to cooperate with the Kenyan government on Somalia. Today there are issues concerning Sudan for which it may be helpful. If you want Moi's cooperation, it is best not to work against his rule. Concerns about democracy exacerbating Kenyan ethnic divisions are a factor too. But perhaps the most important reason for this lessening of democratic pressure is that the other donors, including Britain, are quite ambivalent about pushing democracy in Kenya. And Moi has managed to neuter whatever democratic enthusiasm they might have with what are likely to be short-lived economic liberalizations. Not surprisingly, democracy in Kenya today is stagnating, if not regressing.

A unique set of circumstances permitted a truly unique ambassador to advance democracy in Kenya. [As an aside, a member of Kenya's Ford-Asili opposition group told me recently that Hempstone could win any Kenyan constituency.] But Ambassador Hempstone's "success," while worthy of praise, has proven rather ephemeral. It has not helped that the U.S. and the other donors, for whatever reasons, have failed to build upon it. More crucial though are the Kenyan conditions, including tribalism and the lack of a democratic ethos, which have made Moi's determined repression of democracy child's play.

In Kenya and elsewhere it appears that the U.S. can be most effective in pushing for initial political liberalizations, such as the legalization of political parties and the holding of elections. This is Hempstone's legacy. Democracy building, however, involves a whole set of additional requirements, including the creation of facilitating institutions and supportive values. This is where American power reaches its limits.

Hempstone tactics are not without risk. Anytime the U.S. involves itself in the domestic politics of another nation the way the Ambassador did, charges of American moral and

cultural imperialism or bias toward one particular party are bound to arise. I have little doubt that the Kenyan government knew in its heart that Hempstone was for Kenyan democracy, not the political opposition. Yet pure motives do not inhibit the "aggrieved" party from denouncing the U.S. for attempting to subvert it or even the nation. These charges, however illegitimate, can have adverse consequences both in the country and internationally. They certainly provide an authoritarian regime with an excuse to repress democracy. Such an aggressive American approach toward democracy also spotlights the difficult question of why in Kenya and not Uganda or Saudi Arabia?

Just as the U.S. has an interest in seeing political freedom and democracy advance in Africa, it has an interest in seeing economic freedom advance. Research I have done with a Heritage colleague --published in our *Index of Economic Freedom*-- suggests that a strong correlation exists between economic freedom (low taxes and trade barriers, strong protection of property rights, minimal regulation, etc.) and economic growth, which is a crucial foundation for the type of democracy the U.S. seeks to promote in Africa. (see attached *Index* results.) While we have differed with the Clinton Administration over how best to foster economic freedom, we agree on its desirability.

Our economic freedom survey identifies Africa as the world's economically least free continent, though some African countries are making progress. Of the 24 countries which improved their score --that is, moved forward with free market reforms-- between our 1995 and 1996 surveys, four are sub-Saharan countries: Botswana, Madagascar, Mali and Mozambique. The freest economies in sub-Saharan Africa are Botswana, Uganda, Benin and Zambia, though even these countries badly trail the international pack in economic freedom. Botswana ranks 47th in the world; for comparison sake, Thailand is 22nd. Economic liberalization has a long way to go in Africa.

A challenge to American policymakers arises when a country is progressing with economic but not political liberalization. The U.S. confronts this issue in its role of development aid donor. Should the U.S. aid and support in other ways undemocratic countries which are liberalizing their economies? Or what about countries advancing democracy and not economic freedom? Concerning Africa, Secretary of State Warren Christopher has said "democracy and development go hand in hand." The reality is that many African countries today are advancing political and the economic freedom essential to development at different speeds.

Ghana, for example, is a country that has liberalized its economy (though I am concerned that its reform effort, including privatization, has stalled due to the large amounts of foreign aid it receives) through authoritarianism. While Ghana did hold elections in 1992, most unofficial observers viewed them unfavorably, and it is widely recognized that President Rawlings has continued to stifle democratic progress, including freedom of the press. However this is viewed, what is beyond dispute is that Ghana's reforms were begun over 10 years ago by a very undemocratic government which has enjoyed continuous U.S. support.

Uganda is another "star" of the donor community, being amply rewarded with development aid for liberalizing its economy. Many of the economic reforms President Museveni has engineered deserve applause. Uganda has fully dismantled price controls, thus freeing its all important agricultural sector, and is continuing to open its economy to foreign investment. Consequently, its economy is growing at an impressive clip, close to 10 percent. But like Ghana, Uganda's economic liberalization has been brought about in a politically illiberal environment. President Museveni has often spoken against multiparty democracy, pointing to the tribal divisions which plague his not so long ago war-ravaged country. Serious limits on freedom of assembly and speech exist. So while Uganda has made some modest democratic progress of late, the point remains valid that like Ghana, Uganda has successfully moved down the economic liberalization path by authoritarian means.

Zambia appears to provide an example of popular resistance undermining a desperately needed economic reform attempt by a democratic government. President Chiluba took office enjoying high levels of popularity and legitimacy. He immediately recognized the need to liberalize his country's decrepit, state controlled economy. Yet his reform efforts have been bogged down by democratic resistance, particularly to privatization. Similarly in South Africa, populist pressures are impeding the South African government from undertaking the economic reform agenda, including privatization, tax cuts, and labor reform, that would enable it to exceed its current unsatisfactory 3-4 percent economic growth rate.

On the other hand, consider Mali. Freedom House, the respected, New York-based democracy-monitoring organization, has given Mali a "free" nation designation. *The Index of Economic Freedom*, with its different focus, views Mali as "mostly not free." However, *The Index* recognizes the progress Mali has made in promoting economic freedom, a .4 point improvement over the last year, one of the strongest showings among the countries we tracked. Not surprisingly, a *Washington Post* piece on Mali from last month quoted a Mali businessman as saying "We no longer feel like the government is our competitor." Mali's economy is growing at a quite respectable 5 percent clip. This evidence does not suggest that political and economic transitions aimed at enhanced freedom are incompatible.

Indeed, whether democracy is conducive to undertaking the at times difficult economic liberalizations which *The Index* and most economists recognize as being essential in the developing world is one of the most heavily studied issues in social science. To the casual observer, the examples of Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore and Chile, as well as Ghana and Uganda, suggest that economic liberalization is more successfully brought about by authoritarian regimes, of which several, including Taiwan, have evolved into vibrant democracies. The sputtering of free market reform in Russia, as opposed to China, bolsters this argument. But the academic evidence on this question is rather inconclusive. Several democratic regimes, including Argentina and the Czech Republic, have had success with economic liberalization. There is something to be said for the strength which democratic legitimacy bestows upon economic liberalizers.

My view is that authoritarian regimes generally have greater success in engineering economic liberalization in Africa. [Of course, within the African context, we are contrasting authoritarian regimes with democratically elected governments, not full-fledged democracies.] It should be recognized, however, that these particular undemocratic regimes have had only relative success in bringing about economic reform. Uganda and Ghana still have statist economies, characterized by extensive government ownership of economic assets and exceptionally high trade barriers. There is no African Singapore, and it may be that these governments will find themselves unable (or unwilling) to promote greater economic freedom -- freedom which, after all, is a prescription for their demise.

What I am more certain about is that an economic liberalization criterion for allocating development aid has greater validity than a political liberalization criterion; in other words, if development aid must be given -- and in my view it has done immense damage throughout Africa -- and can at best be of marginal benefit -- it should not be rationalized by a country's democratic progress. This is not to devalue democracy. And I do not advocate supporting authoritarian regimes with development aid. I am merely suggesting that *development aid without free market reform in Africa or anywhere promotes economic stagnation, to the detriment of democracy. For the fact is that democracy does not grow where governments actively seek to deny their citizens economic power*. Unfortunately, for a host of reasons, the U.S. development aid effort often supports African countries making little or no progress with economic freedom.

It is easy to be pessimistic about Africa. It is the world's poorest continent. This poverty bodes poorly for African democracy of most every sort. Yet some African countries are moving forward with economic freedom and growth. The realization of truly democratic political systems will be a measure of Africa's success in building upon this economic progress.

1996 Index of Economic Freedom Rankings

Rank	Country	Trade	Taxation	Government Consumption	Monetary Policy	Foreign Investment	Banning	Wage/Prices	Property Rights	Regulation	Black Market	1995 Score	1996 Score
1	Hong Kong	1	1.5	1	2	1	1	2	1	1		125	125
2	Singapore	1	3		1		2	1	1	1		125	125
3	Bahrain	2	1	4	1	2	2	2	1	1		6	17
4	New Zealand	2	3.5	2	2	2	1	2	1	2		.75	.75
4	Switzerland	2	3	2	1	2	2	2	1	3			
6	Netherlands	2	4.5	2	1	2	2	2	1	2		185	185
7	United States	2	4	2	2	2	2	2	2	2		9	19
8	Denmark	2	3.5	4	1	2	2	1	2	2		95	95
8	Luxembourg	2	4.5	2	1	2	2	2	1	2		195	195
8	Taiwan	2	2.5	2	1	3	3	2	2	2		195	195
8	United Kingdom	2	4.5	1	1	3	2	2	1	2		95	95
7	Bahamas	2	4	2	2	2	2	2	2	2		70	70
7	Canada	2	4	2	2	3	2	2	2	2		2	2
7	Czech Republic	1	4	2	2	2	1	2	2	2		2	2
15	Austria	2	4.5	3	1	2	1	2	2	3		205	205
15	Japan	2	4.5	1	1	3	3	2	1	2		95	95
17	Australia	2	4	3	1	2	2	2	1	3		22	22
7	Belgium	2	5	2	2	2	1	2	3	3		21	21
17	Germany	2	5	2	2	2	2	2	1	3		20	20
17	United Arab Emirates	2	1	3	1	4	3	3	2	2		21	21
21	Ireland	2	5	2	2	2	2	2	1	2		22	22
22	Finland	2	4	2	1	2	3	3	1	4		23	23
22	France	2	4	2	1	3	3	3	2	3		23	23
22	South Korea	2	4	2	2	3	3	3	2	2		23	23
22	Thailand	3	3	2	1	3	3	3	1	3		23	23
26	Estonia	2	3.5	2	4	1	2	2	2	2		225	235
27	Kuwait	2	1	4	2	4	3	3	2	2		24	24
27	Malaysia	3	3	2	1	3	3	3	2	2		245	24
27	Panama	4	3	2	1	2	2	2	3	2		27	24
30	Chile	4	2.5	1	3	3	3	3	2	2		25	245
30	El Salvador	3	2.5	1	3	2	2	2	3	3		265	245
30	Norway	3	4.5	3	1	2	3	3	1	3		245	245
33	Trinidad and Tobago	5	5	2	2	1	2	2	1	3		25	25
34	Sweden	2	4.5	5	1	2	3	2	2	3		265	255
35	Cyprus	3	4	3	1	2	2	3	3	2		26	26
35	Portugal	2	5	3	2	2	2	3	2	3		78	78
37	Argentina	4	3.5	2	5	2	2	2	2	2		285	265

1996 Index of Economic Freedom Rankings

Rank	Country	Trade	Taxation	Government Consumption	Monetary Policy	Foreign Investment	Banking	Wage/Prices	Property Rights	Regulation	Black Market	1995 Score	1996 Score
37	Paraguay	2	2.5	1	4	1	2	3	3	3	5	2.75	2.65
37	Sri Lanka	4	3.5	1	2	3	2	1	2	3	4	2.8	2.65
37	Tunisia	5	3.5	2	2	2	2	2	3	3	3	2.85	2.65
41	Belize	5	4	2	1	2	3	2	2	3	3	2.7	2.7
41	Italy	3	5	3	2	2	3	3	2	3	3	2.5	2.7
41	Jamaica	3	3	2	4	2	2	3	2	3	3	2.8	2.7
41	Morocco	4	4	2	1	2	3	3	2	3	3	2.9	2.7
41	Spain	2	5	2	2	2	3	3	2	3	3	2.6	2.7
46	Bolivia	2	2.5	3	4	2	2	1	3	4	3	3.2	2.75
47	Botswana	4	3	4	2	3	2	2	3	2	2	3.05	2.8
47	Costa Rica	4	3	2	3	3	3	2	3	3	3	2.9	2.8
47	Greece	7	3	3	4	2	4	3	2	3	3	2.6	2.8
47	Jordan	4	4	2	2	2	2	3	2	3	4	2.7	2.8
47	Uruguay	3	3	2	5	2	2	2	3	3	3	2.9	2.8
47	Western Samoa	3	4	2	2	3	3	3	3	2	2	2.94	2.83
53	Uganda	4	3.5	3	5	2	3	1	2	N/A	2	2.94	2.83
54	Guatemala	3	2.5		4	3	3	3	3	3	3	3.05	2.85
54	Indonesia	2	3.5		2	2	3	3	3	4	5	3.15	2.85
54	Oman	3	3.5	5	1	3	4	3	2	2	2	2.65	2.85
57	Hungary	4	4	3	4	2	2	2	2	3	3	2.8	2.9
57	Israel	2	5	5	3	1	2	2	2	2	4	3.1	2.9
57	Philippines	5	3		2	3	3	2	2	2	4	3.3	2.9
57	Saudi Arabia	4	4	5	1	4	3	3	3	2	4	2.9	2.9
57	Swaziland	4	4	2	2	4	3	3	1	2	2	2.9	2.9
62	Benin	4	3.5	3	1	3	3	3	3	3	4	2.9	2.9
62	Lebanon	2	2.5	2	5	3	3	3	3	3	3	2.95	2.95
62	The Slovak Republic	2	4.5	3	3	2	2	2	3	3	5	2.95	2.95
62	Zambia	3	3.5	2	5	3	3	2	3	3	3	2.75	2.95
66	Barbados	4	4	3	3	2	2	2	3	4	3	3.05	2.95
66	Colombia	4	4	1	4	2	2	2	3	3	4	3	3
66	Peru	4	3	1	4	2	2	2	3	3	5	2.9	3
66	So. Africa	5	4	3	3	2	3	2	3	4	4	3.4	3
66	Turkey	2	5	2	2	2	3	2	3	3	3	3.0	3
71	Kenya	3	3.5	3	2	3	3	3	3	4	5	3.0	3
71	Latvia	4	2.5	2	5	3	3	3	3	4	3	3.05	3.05
71	Malta	4	4	2	1	2	3	2	3	3	3	3.05	3.05
71	Pakistan	5	4.5	2	2	2	3	4	3	4	5	3.75	3.05
71		5	4.5	2	2	2	2	3	4	4	4	3.5	3.05

1996 Index of Economic Freedom Rankings

Rank	Country	Trade	Taxation	Government Consumption	Monetary Policy	Foreign Investment	Banking	Wage/ Prices	Property Rights	Regulation	Black Market	1995 Score	1996 Score
71	Poland	4	35	3	5	2	3	3	2	3	2	325	305
76	Gabon	5	45	3	1	2	N/A	3	3	3	3	306	306
77	Fiji	5	3	2	1	3	3	3	3	4	4	33	31
77	Mali	3	5	3	1	2	3	3	3	3	5	35	31
77	Papua New Guinea	5	3	3	1	3	4	3	3	3	3	31	31
80	Ecuador	4	25	1	5	2	3	3	3	4	4	325	315
80	Honduras	4	35	2	4	3	3	3	3	4	4	315	315
82	Ghana	5	3	3	2	3	3	2	3	4	2	31	32
83	Algeria	5	35	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	315	325
83	Ivory Coast	5	35	3	1	3	3	3	3	3	3	325	325
83	Nigeria	5	35	2	4	2	4	2	3	4	4	325	325
86	Guinea	5	45	2	3	3	2	2	3	4	3	35	325
86	Madagascar	5	35	2	3	3	2	2	3	4	5	335	335
86	Mexico	3	35	2	3	4	4	2	3	3	4	35	335
86	Slovenia	4	45	2	5	2	4	4	3	4	3	305	335
90	Guyana	4	4	2	5	3	4	2	3	4	4	37	34
90	Malawi	4	4	3	3	3	3	3	3	4	4	34	34
90	Senegal	5	4	5	3	3	3	4	2	4	3	34	34
93	Cape Verde	5	N/A	3	2	2	5	4	2	4	4	344	344
94	Albania	4	35	5	3	2	3	3	3	3	5	355	345
94	Brazil	4	35	2	5	3	3	3	3	4	4	33	345
94	Dominican Republic	5	25	2	5	3	3	2	4	4	4	34	345
94	Egypt	5	45	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	35	345
94	Moldova	3	45	3	5	3	3	3	3	3	4	41	345
94	Romania	5	35	3	4	3	3	2	3	4	4	35	345
100	Bulgaria	3	5	3	5	2	3	3	3	4	4	35	345
100	Lithuania	4	3	3	5	3	4	3	3	3	4	35	35
100	Mongolia	4	5	4	5	3	3	3	2	3	3	333	35
100	Nepal	2	3	4	5	4	4	4	4	5	5	35	35
100	Russia	4	4	3	5	2	3	4	4	4	4	35	35
100	Venezuela	4	4	2	5	3	3	3	3	3	5	30	35
106	Belarus	4	45	3	5	3	3	3	3	3	5	365	355
107	Cameroon	5	4	3	1	3	2	3	3	3	5	36	16
107	Nicaragua	5	3	2	5	2	3	3	4	4	5	39	36

1996 Index of Economic Freedom Rankings

Rank	Country	Trade	Taxation	Government Consumption	Monetary Policy	Foreign Investment	Banking	Wage/Prices	Property Rights	Regulation	Black Market	1995 Score	1996 Score
07	Bangladesh	5	3.5	2	2	3	3	4	4	5	5	3.9	3.65
08	Lesotho	4	4.5	3	3	3	4	4	3	4	4	3.65	3.65
10	Burkina Faso	5	4	3	1	2	4	4	4	5	5	3.7	3.7
11	Croatia	3	3	5	5	3	3	4	3	4	4	3.7	3.7
11.2	Ethiopia	5	4	3	2	4	4	3	4	4	4	3.8	3.7
11.2	Niger	4	4	3	4	4	4	4	4	4	5	3.7	3.7
11.2	Romania	3	5	5	5	2	3	2	4	4	4	3.55	3.7
12	Zimbabwe	5	4	3	4	4	3	3	3	4	4	3.5	3.7
17	Armenia	3	3.5	5	5	4	3	4	3	4	3	3.75	3.75
17	Serra Leone	5	4.5	3	2	3	4	4	3	4	5	3.7	3.75
17	Yemen	5	3.5	3	5	3	4	3	4	3	5	3.75	3.75
2	China	5	4	5	3	3	3	3	4	4	4	3.8	3.8
2	Congo	5	5	3	1	4	4	3	4	4	5	3.9	3.8
121	Mauritania	3	4	4	2	4	5	4	4	4	4	3.8	3.8
24	Georgia	3	2.5	4	5	3	4	4	4	4	5	3.85	3.85
25	Suriname	5	4	5	4	3	4	3	3	3	5	3.9	3.9
26	Ukraine	5	5	3	5	3	4	3	4	4	4	3.9	3.9
27	Mozambique	5	3.5	3	5	4	4	3	4	4	4	4.1	4.05
28	Sudan	5	3	3	5	4	4	4	4	3	4	4.2	4.1
129	Haiti	5	3	3	2	5	5	4	5	5	5	4.2	4.2
129	Syria	5	5	3	5	4	5	4	4	2	5	4.2	4.2
29	Zaire	4	3	3	5	4	4	4	4	4	5	4.2	4.2
32	Myanmar	5	3	5	4	4	4	4	4	5	5	4.3	4.3
33	Angola	5	3.5	4	5	4	4	4	4	5	5	4.35	4.35
134	Azerbaijan	5	4	5	4	5	4	5	4	5	5	4.7	4.7
134	Iran	5	5	5	4	5	5	4	5	4	5	4.7	4.7
134	Libya	5	5	5	2	5	5	5	5	5	5	4.7	4.7
134	Somalia	5	5	5	5	4	5	3	5	5	5	4.7	4.7
134	Vietnam	5	5	5	5	4	4	4	5	5	5	4.7	4.7
139	Iraq	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	4	5	4.9	4.9
140	Cuba	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5.0	5.0
140	Laos	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5.0	5.0
140	North Korea	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5.0	5.0



ISBN 0-16-053642-1



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